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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
In the early period of Islam, the term "philosophy” was not 
is use among Muslims. Their faith in God did not raise any diffi­
cult problems for them. Their creed ('aqidah) was simply based on 
the Quran and the traditions of the prophet Muliammad, peace be upon 
him. However when the current of Greek philosophy penetrated the 
Muslim world, the situation changed. The contact of Islam with 
Greek philosophy, as well as with Christian and Jewish theology, 
produced the rational school of the Mu'tazilites as well as the anti- 
rational school of the Ash'arites.^
The centre of the development of Islamic philosophy was the 
Arabic translation of works originally written in Greek. The age of 
the development of Islamic philosophy began with the first Muslim 
peripatetic, al-Kindi (d.810) and continued up to the death of 
Averroes (d.ll98). The relationship between Muslim and Greek philo­
sophy is evident and strong. Al-Kindi, the pionner ninth century 
philosopher justified his dependence of Greek philosophy in this way:
"We ought not to be ashamed of appreciating the truth and 
of acquiring it wherever it comes from, even if it comes 
from races distant and nations different from us. For 
the seeker of truth nothing takes precedence over the 
truth and there is not a disparagement of the truth, nor 
belittling either of him who speaks it or of him who con­veys it." 2
The continuous controversy between the Muslim theologians, 
who are better loiown as the "mutakallimun" and the muslim philoso­
phers reached a climax when al-Ghazali wrote his political philo­
sophical treatise, TaJiafut al-Falasifat (The Incoherence of the phi-
losophers) as an attack on the philosophers. Averroes' period is 
regarded as the climax of the development of Islamic philosophy, 
and his death is generally recognized as the commencement of the 
decline of Islamic philosophy in the Islamic world.
All scholars, both Muslim and Christian, recognize Averroes 
as the last great peripatetic philosopher, "His influence, strange­
ly enough, was greater in the Christian than in the Muliammedan world, 
and the first impact of his writings on Christendom produced a shock
■zwhich extended to those of Aristotle himself." Averroes' works be­
gan penetrating the western world during the thirteenth century and 
many Christian scholars undertook to study his thought, establishing 
a group in Paris which were called "Averroists" and whose influence 
later extended to some universities in Italy.
A similar controversy between theofogiran and philosophers 
happened in the Christian world during the Middle Ages. At that 
time theology was the dominant and most respected subject taught at 
a university. It had never been challenged before. Paris was re­
garded as the summit of theological studies, and the mastery of theo­
logy was naturally looked on as the crown of one's academic career. ^
Though some Christians tried to prevent Aristotle's thought 
from penetrating the Christian world, they failed. Its appearance 
provoked controversy from the beginning. Albert the Great and St. 
Tliomas Aquinas, who were tivo great theologians as well as philoso­
phers, were responsible for purifying what was regarded as the _ 
heresy in Aris to t eliani sm. They, in fact, did not reject Aristo- 
telianism in total, nor did they accept it as a whole.
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The history of Christian philosophy in the thirteenth century 
is the history of a conflict arising from the attempts to subordinate 
philosophy to theology, which was accentuated when the complete works 
of Aristotle became accessible to scholars through translations into 
Latin from the Greek and Arabic conraentaries. Thomas Aquinas was en­
thusiastic to show that faith does not conflict with reason. Certain 
truths of Christian faith are beyond the reach of reason, but they 
are not contrary to it. Aquinas pointed out that the argument from 
the authority of God, the revealer, is more solid and powerful than 
any other.^  Christian theology, according to Aquinas, is a science 
of God,^  which is superior to other sciences. So theology judges 
philosophy in the same sense that philosophy judges sciences, be­
cause philosophy is the highest of the human sciences, that is of
7sciences which know things by the natural light of reason.
Both Averroed and Aquinas held the conviction that philoso­
phy is not opposed to religion, and they also recognized that reve­
lation is superior to intellect. In certain cases reason should 
incline to the revelation. Aquinas, however, departed from Averroes 
in many areas, so he did not hesitate to refute those ideas of 
Averroes which contradicted with Christian teachings. Although 
Averroes and Aquinas were not contemporaries, it is a fact that 
Aquinas had the opportunity to study and evalute some of Averroes' 
works which already existed at the University of Paris during his 
time.
Tlie title of this thesis is as a recognition that Averroes 
and Aquinas were two great scholars of the Middle Ages who repre­
sented the two great revealed religions, Christinity and Islam; ^
4 -
Averroes as a representative of Muslim philosophy, and Aquinas as a 
representative of Christian philosophy. Both drew upon the meta­
physics of Aristotelianism, and they both produced careful commen­
taries on Aristolte's thought. They had the same aspirations, to 
reconcile religion and philosophy and to diminish the gap between 
revelation and reason. It is important to recognize that the intel­
lectual relationship between Christians and muslims in the Middle 
Ages was veiy close. It is also an undeniable fact that Muslim 
thought made an important contribution to western thought, especial­
ly in introducing Platonism and Aristotelianism to the Christian 
world. This contribution took the form of translations, either from 
Arabic or Greek, by Muslims as well as Jews and Christians. Many 
works of Muslim philosophy, such as those of al-Kindi, al-Farabi, 
Avicenna and Averroes were to be found in Paris.
llie role of the college of translation at Toledo under the 
direction of Raymon, Bishop of Toledo (1126 - 1151), was to "open 
a virgin field to scholars and for the first time provide them with 
direct knowledge of Pagan thought uncontaininated by Christian 
thought."  ^ Aquinas as a great scholar at the height of the Middle 
Ages was not a stranger to some of the works of muslim philosophy 
such as Avicenna, al-Gliazali and also Averroes.
The author, as a Mislim, is interested to learn of Chris­
tian theological thought, and to compare some areas of agreement 
and disagreement between Christian and Islamic teaching throught 
the study of the chosen topic. As has been mentioned before, Chris­
tianity and Islam are religions of revelation. Therefore, the 
author strongly believes that there should be, in many circumstances,
5 -
some similarities, because the source is one, God. Since tliis is 
the author's first incursion into the study of Christianity it is 
inevitable that his argtunents and expressions will contain some 
weaknesses
The approach used by the author in this study is to consider 
first Averroes' discussion of each topic examined, and then to follow 
this by an exposition of Aquinas' position. This regarded as suitable 
because chronologically Averroes came first, and Aquinas in many cir­
cumstances refered to Averroes' works and criticized them.
This thesis is not primarily a critical analysis of the ideas 
of Averroes and Aquinas, but only a comparative description of the 
ideas of both. The purpose of this study is to bring out the simila­
rities and dissimilarities in their discussion of the chosen topics. 
Thus our study is a comparative study and is based on the texts of 
both men. Averroes' major works which are used in this study are 
Taliafut al-Taliifut, Al-Kashf, Fasl al-Maqal and Tafsir Mi Ba'd al-
Tabl^at, while Aquinas ' works are the Summa Theologiae and the Suimia 
] nContra Gentile.
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one dis­
cusses briefly the biographical and philosophical background of 
Averroes and Aquinas, and is divided into four parts. First, it 
briefly outlines the life and works of Averroes chronologically. 
Second, there is a discussion of Averroes' attempts to reconcile the 
controversy between religion and philosophy. The third part deals 
with the life and works of Aquinas in chromological form, just as 
with Averroes. Fourth, the author discusses Aguinas' reconciliation
. 1 I
6of Christianity and Aristotelinisni.
Chapter two is a discussion of the general doctrine of God 
and of the existence of God. It is divided into two parts. First, 
there is given a brief discussion of the doctrine of God in Averroes' 
and Aquinas' thought. The second part deals with a treatment of the 
proof of the existence of God whicli is divided into three sub-sec­
tions. In the first sub-section, the author lays down Averroes' and 
Aquinas' position on the demonastrability of the existence of God. 
Hie second sub-section is a discussion of Averroes' argument which 
proves God exists. Lastly there is a treatment of Aquinas' argument 
about the existence of God.
Chapter three is a discussion of God's knowledge, and it is 
divided into three parts. First is a discussion of tlie question on 
whether or not we can speak of God's intelligence. The second part 
contains a discussion of some of the characteristics of God's know­
ledge. This part is divided into three sub-sections. The first 
sub-section deals with God's knowledge of contingent events, whether 
He knows or does not laiow them. Hie second treats God's knowledge 
of contingent events, wheter His Imowledge of them is in general or 
in particular. Hie third part discusses God's loiowledge and human 
loiowledge, and the relationship between them.
Chapter four discusses the predestination of God, and it is 
divided into three parts. First, the preliminary problem is stated. 
In this part there is a discussion of the basic problem arising in 
Christinity and in Islam concerning predestination, and the contro­
versy among theologians about this concept. The second part dis-
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eusses certain of God's attributes in relation to predestination, 
and it is divided into two sub-sections. First is the discussion 
of God's will and power. In this sub-section there is a discussion 
of hunan free will and power, because liuman free will and power have 
a close relationship to God's will and power. Second is a discusr 
sion of God's justic. This discussion focuses on whether God can 
be said to be just or unjust. The third part outlines and discus­
ses the concept of predestination as the conclusion to be drawn from 
this chapter.
Cliapter five concludes our study and consists of a summary 
of the whole discussion. The author evaluates cind compares the 
ideas of Averroes and Aquinas covered in the previous chapters.
Notes to Intdoruction
1. George J. Taweh, "The Climax of Philosophical Conflict in 
Islam," Muslim World, Vol. 42, 1952, p. 173.
2. Al-Kindi, Al-Kindi's Metaphysics, trn. with intro, and comm,
by Alfred L. Irvy, Albany, State University of New York Press,
1974, p. 58.
3. C.H. Haskin, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 7th ed,, 1979, p. 347.
4. F.C. Copieston, A history of Medieval Philosophy, London,
Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1972, p. 153.
5. STla, q. 1, a. 8.
6. STla, q. 1, a. 3,
7. J. Maritain, An Introduction to philosophy, tr. by E.I. Wat kin, 
London, Sheed & Ward, 1956, p. 93.
8. E. Brehier, The Middle Ages and Renaissance, tr. by Wade Baskin,
1st Phoenix ed., Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1967,
p. 116.
9. The author is not well acquainted with Christian thought, and 
in consequence his knowledge of Christianity is limited. Fur­
ther, Enclish is not the author's first language, nor is Arabic* 
However, the author's knowledge of Arabic is better than his 
knowledge of English. For this reason all translations from 
Arabic texts used in this thesis are that of the author.
10. Hiought there are many other works of Aquinas such as ^
Veritate and Questione Disputate which include important dis­
cussions of God, the works mentioned above are perhaps suf­
ficient for the limited purposes of this study.
CHAPTER ONE
BIOGRAPHICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
BACKGROUND
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A. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF AVERROES
In the philosophical world the name of Averroes (Ibn Rushd) 
is not unlmown especially among researchers in philosophy, and he 
was highly esteemed by both Islamic and Christian philosophers in 
the Middle Ages. His popularity in the Jewish and Christian worlds 
was primarily as a commentator on Aristotle.
His name was Muhammad ibn Alimad ibn Muliammad ibn Rushd, butt « ê
in the Muslim world he was better loiown as Ibn Rushd though to wes­
tern Christians, he was known by the name of Averroes, a scholar of 
the Quran, natural science, theology and philosophy.
IHe was born in 1126 in Cordova, the largest toivn in Spain 
at that time. He belonged to a renowned family which produced scho­
lars of jurisprudence and law. Due to their scholarship, members of 
the family of Averroes held the post of judge (qadi) at different
times. His grandfather (450 - 520 H.), who was an expert in fiqh of
2the Malikite sect was a great scholar or jurisprudence. He was ap­
pointed as a judge during the period of the caliphate of al-Murabit 
(Almuravides). His father  ^(d.564 H.) as his grandfather, was also 
skilled in fiqh of the Malikite sect and was appointed as a judge 
in Cordova during the caliphate of al-Riwalihid (Almohades). Histo­
rical accounts show that Averroes undubtedly inherited the intellec­
tual ability of his grandfather. He grew up and was educated in 
this highly intellectual environment. His elementary education was 
at his home, and his first teacher was his own father who taught 
him the fiqh of the Malik sect, the traditions of the prophet 
(haditli) and the theology of Ash'ari.
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In addition to his father were many other teachers such as 
Abu Muhammad ibn Rizq (530 - 560 H.), Abu Bakr ibn al~ %rabi (468 - 
543 H.), Abu Manvan ibn Masarrat (d.552 H,) and Abu Qasim ibn 
Bashkuwal (495 - 578 H.). All of them taught him fiqh and hadith.
He was said to have learned philosophy from Ibn Bajjat (d.533 H./ 
1138 A,D.) and Ibn Taufayl (d.ll85 A.D.). There has been some doubt 
cast as to whether he actually studied philosophy under the former. 
The latter, Ibn Tufayl, however played an important role in Averroes' 
career. Medicine he learned from Abu Maiivan ibn Zulir (484 - 557 H.) 
and from Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zulir (504 - 595 H.). He also learned 
philosophy and medicine from Abu Ja‘*far Ha run al-Turjali (484-558 H).
Averroes was one of the graduates of the University of 
Cordova, but there exists no exact date of his graduation. He, how­
ever, was an educated man when he was 28 years old, for in 1153 he 
was invited by the caliph al-Miwalihid A^bd al-Mi'min (526 - 558 H.) 
to come to Morocco and give guidance to the caliph in building of 
schools and colleges. He also was engaged there in astronomical ob­
servation. After some time he come back to Cordova, involving him­
self in teaching at the University of Cordova for about 9 years.
During his teaching at this university he began his career 
as a productive writer. He wrote al-Kulliyyat Fi al-Tibb or Col­
lege (1162), a great medical work which contains seven volumes and 
was used in Europe for centuries.
Ibn Tufayl, in addition to being his teacher, was also res­
ponsible for introducing Averroes to the caliph Abu Ya^aqub ibn Abd 
al-Mu'min around 1169, At his first meeting the caliph discussed
11
witli him some philosophical problems. The meeting with the caliph 
had two concrete results: one was the appointment of Averroes as a
judge in Seville in 1169; the other was his undertaking, in deference 
to the wish of the caliph, to comment upon Aristotle's works. This 
was because the caliph himself complained about the obscurity of 
Aristotle's works and of their previous translations. He wished them 
to be clearly explained. He asked Ibn Taufayl to undertake this work, 
but at that time he was too old and too busy, so he asked Averroes to 
undertake the work. ^
Averroes did not finish his commentaries on Aristotle at 
Seville because in 1171 he come back to Cordova and was appointed as 
a judge there, and then as the chief of judges. At Cordova he con­
tinued his work begun at Seville. His careful study and analysis of 
Aristotle's texts ivas more complete and in greater detail than any 
other study undertalcen'by previous Mislim philosophers. He collec­
ted all available translations of Aristotle's works with had been 
done up to his time, abd compared them before he began his commentary. 
His commentaries on Aristotle which imply various brandies of Icnow- 
ledge^  are divided into three kinds : short, medium and long. Most
of his commentaries were translated into Latin. Part of tliem through 
Latin translations reached Thomas Aquinas while he was in Paris.
During his appointment as the chief of judges (qadi al-Qudat) 
in Cordova he also wrote two theological treatises : Al-Kashf an-
Manaliij^  written around 1179 and Fasl al-Maqal^^  written between 
1179 - 1180. Tlie whole content of the former treatise is concerned 
with theological discussions. In it he criticized Muslim theologians 
(mutakallimun), especially the Ash’arites whose method in discussion
12 -
of God, according to him, was imscriptural and beyond the compre­
hension of the masses, and at the same time their methods were not
11of the type containing apodeictic proofs. So to ractify this pro­
blem he formed his own method ôf discussion of God by referring to 
tlie Quran. Tlie latter treatise is Averroes' effort to reconcile
philosophy and religion, for, according to him, philosophy and reli-
12gion are not mutually contradictory. At the end of Fasl al-Miqal 
there is an appendix called al-Daraimat where Averroes tried to solve 
the problem of God’s knowledge.
In 1182 Averroes was appointed as a personal physician to 
the caliph Abu Yusuf al-Mansur in Marakesh and continued in this role 
until he was sued before the court in 1195. During his service in 
the caliph's court he wrote the Taliafut al-Tahafut (the Incoherence of 
the Incoheren) in 1180 - one of his greatest philosophical-theolo­
gical works. This work was written to refute al-Ghazali's attack on 
philosophers who wrote Taliafut al-Falasifat (tlie Incoherence of the
Philosophers ). Tahafut al-Tahafut is the product of Averroes' 
maturest thought, a masterly exposition in which the author's most 
fundamental thoughts are brought into focus,
Averroes continued in favour during the beginning of the 
reign of Ya^aqub Yusuf A^bd al-Mu'min to the caliph Abu Yusuf al- 
Mansur, where in the caliphate of al-Mansur he reached his higest 
position when he suddenly fell into disgrace. This was the result 
of the opposition shown to his writings by the mutakallimun and the 
fuqalia '.
Averroes accused the mutakallimun of separating muslims in-
13
15to various groups by using dialectical arguments (jadal) and al­
legorical interpretations (ta'wil) of scripture. Tlie allegorical 
interpretation of scripture cannot be disclosed to all men, because 
according to him men are on different levels with respect to their 
path of assent (tasdiq). Some men come to assent through demonstra­
tion, some come to assent through dialectical argument, and others 
come to assent through rhetorical argument. The demonstrative me­
thod is only for the demonstrative classes who have deep intellectual 
capacity to understand philosophy (al-hikmat). The dialectical argu­
ment is used by those who also have intellectual ability but their 
ability to understand philosophy (hikmat) is lower than what belongs 
to the demonstrative class although they also try to interpret ambi­
guous scriptural passages. Those in this groups are generally muta- 
kallimun. The rehetorical argument according to Averroes is for the
masses. They just take these passages in their apparent meaning, and
17allegorical interpretation of them is imbelief.
Averroes tried to narrow the gap between religion and philo­
sophy by turning to the Quran, He wished to assert his judgement by 
looking at its apparent meaning without interpreting any of it al- 
legoricallyexcept when the allegorical meaning was self evident. His 
effort to achive this purpose can be found in his two treatises - 
Fasl al-Maqal and Al-Kashf a^n Mcmaliij.
Averroes held that revealed law (shar*) and philosophy have 
the same purpose - to seek the truth. Philosophy can show by demon­
strative argument (burhan) the nature of the truth contained in the 
law. Only philosophers accroding to him can properly use demonstra­
tive argument to illuminate the hidden meaning of revealed truth.
- 14
This, however, does not mean tliat the two other arguments are wrong. 
They are also valid but acceptance is less rational than acceptance 
based upon demonstrative argument.
Averroes’ philosophy was Aristotelian on the whole, but there 
were inevitably development and accretions of his own as a Muslim who 
was influenced by the Quiran. As a follower of Aristotelianism, some 
of his doctrones such as the eternity of the world, God’s Icnowledge, 
the soul and intellect and the double truth theory created contro­
versy and were strongly opposed by the mutakallimun. Even his doc­
trine of the unity of intellect caused conflict among Christians in 
the thirteenth century at the University of Paris where Thomas 
Aquinas wrote a treatise to refute it.
The mutakallimun and the fuqaha ’ were suspicious of the in­
fluence of Averroes and they accused him of diviating from Islam.
They had opposed Averroes since the caliphate of Abu Ya aqub, but 
they did not succeed in the beginning, for the caliph Abu Ya^aqub 
was very keenly interested in philosophy.So their complaint proved 
to be ineffective. However, they got their chance to refute him when 
Yusuf al-Mansur, Abu Ya^aqub’s son, became the caliph (1184 - 1199) 
especially in the last years of his reign. Though at the beginning, 
the caliph Yusuf al-Mansur was interested in philosophy, he tended
towards sufism at the end of his life. He commanded the people to
19refer to the Quran and the traditions (hadith). This gave a chance 
to those who disliked philosophy to oppose Averroes as a philosopher. 
They appealed to the caliph that philosophers in general and Averroes 
in particular should not be given freedom to speak and write whatever 
they wished. The caliph accepted their suggestion and he expelled
- 15
Averroes to Lucena, a place outside of Cordova. At that time
Averroes was over 70 years old. The caliph did not only banish
Averroes but also ordered that all philosophical works which were
20considered dangerous to religion, including Averrous’, should be 
burned and forbidden to be learned.
21Tliough there are various reasons ' given why the caliph ex­
pelled Averroes, what was obvious was the attitude of the u^lama^  ^
who disliked philosophy in general and Averroes himself in parti­
cular, because of his high position in the caliphate of al-Miv\ralihid. 
Hie judgement concerning Averroes carried out by the caliph was 
forced and urged on him by those who were jealous of Averroes. Their
accusation was hidden under the banner of religion, ethics and some-
23times politics, but really their enmity was personal.
During the caliphate Abu Yusuf al-Mansur there was a contro­
versy between the u^lama’ and the philosophers.^^  The fundamental 
conflict revolved arround two aspects ; the first was the political
25aspect, and the second was the aspect relating to religious sects. 
Averroes as the chied of judges, had influence in the al-Miwahhid’s 
administration. At the same period the caliph Abu Yusuf al-Mansur 
was engaged in Spain in a war against Christian,so he needed tlie 
support of the fuqaha’ who had long imposed on the people their 
rigorous orthodoxy. This opportunity was taken by the fuqalia’ to 
influence the caliph to take action against philosopher and their 
teachings.
After one year of banishment, Averroes was recalleh by the 
caliph to Morocco. After wliich the caliph allowed people to again
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27take up the study of philosophy. Averroes did not have long to 
enjoy this return to favour, for he died in Marakesh in December,
1198 at the age of 72 years. He was buried at Marakesh, and after 
about three months his body was taken to Cordova to be baried there.
After tlie death of Averroes the world of Islamic philosophy
fell into decline. He had not so many disciples among muslims, and
his popularity was less among them than among Christians. Most of
his works were preserved in Hebraic and Latin translations. The
Hebraic translations were done by such authors as Moses bin Samuel
28Ibn Tibbon, Kalonymus bin Kalonymus, Jacob Antolio and others, 
while the Latin translators were such as Michael Scot (d. ca 1235),
90Herman the German (d.l272) and William de Lunis, Half of his life
was devoted in producing his works whether they were origional or 
30his commentaries.
Part of his doctrine was not only opposed by muslim but also
by Christians, and was developed in the thirteenth century at the
University of Paris by Latin Averroists. At that time Thomas Aquinas
played an important part to refute Averroes’ doctrine. And in the
fourteenth century Averroism spread to the University of Bologna^ ^
32and the University of Padua in Italy.
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B. AVERROES’ ATTEMPT IN RECONCILIATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY
Averroes was not the first muslim philosopher who tried to
33reconcile religion and philosophy. His predecessors, for example, 
Al-Kindi in "Rasa’il al-Kindi al Falasafiyyat", Avicenna in "Al- 
Najat" and "Al-Isharat", Ibn Tufayl in "Hayy Yaqazan", Al-Farabi in 
"Al-Jam^  Bayn Ra’yi Hakimayn" had all tried to deal with this matter.
34Averroes, a great patron and admirer of Aristotle, strove 
valiantly to promote and defend the study of philosophy against the 
more conservative theologians who prescribed its study as heresy. He 
developed a theological method of far greater stringency than his 
predecessors.
In his book "Tahafut al-Tahafut" he was concerned with in­
tellectual discussion, defending philosophers’ ideas than in his 
' ’Kashf ^ an-Pknaliij ' ’ in which he dealt with the opinions of the theo­
logians (mutakallimun) especially the Ash arites and the Mu^ tazilites. 
Tlie discussion in this book was aimed at the masses,therefore there 
was no philosophical arguments used in it.
In his effort to reconcile religion and philosophy,Averroes 
proposed the problem of whether Islam (SharO allows or prohibits us 
to study philosophy. To answer this, he firmly stated that the re­
vealed law (shar^ ) encourages us to study it.^  ^ For him philosophy
was nothing other than the study of existants (al-Mawjudat) and ref-
c — 38lection (i tibar) on them as an indication of the Divine Artisan.
This means that philosophy is an effort to Imow the Greater from His
creation. Hi us philosophy, the aim of which is to study nature.
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which brings us to the knowledge of God, is not contradictory to the 
39revealed law. What is different is the method of reaching the 
truth. Tlie truth is one, so truth does not oppose truth, but accords 
with it and bears witness to it.^ ^
Averroes was committed to the postulate of the unity of 
truth. He was also committed to the authority of the Quran, because 
the knowledge which comes from its revelation completes intellectual 
Iciowledge.
Averroes, in strengthening the idea in which "Shar^ " encou­
rages us to study philosophy, refered to some verses of the Quran 
which urge us to use the intellect. For example, "Therefore take 
heed, you who have eyes",^  ^ "Have they not considered the dominion 
of the heaven and of the earth, and what things God has created? 
and there are many other examples, Averroes also insisted that if 
a lawyer (faqih) could infer from many Quranic verses in order to 
make a judgement using legal categories (qiyas fiqhiy), then there 
was no reason why a philosopher (al-^ arif) sould not do the same 
thing using intellectual reasoning (qiyas a^qliy) to make a judg­
ment about the existence of God. In fact, he argued that it was 
even more fitting to do so.^ ^
45The Quran, according to Averroes, has two meanings; an 
exterior meaning (daliir) and an interior meaning (batin). The rea­
son why the Quran has two meanings is because human beings are at 
different levels with respect to their faith (tasdiq).Averroes 
used three terms to distinguish the level of three kinds of human 
beings. First, "Jimiliur" (the masses) are the majority of people;
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second are the "Mutakallimun" (theologians); and third are the
c „ _" Ulama’" or the " Arifin" (philosophers) who are the minority of
people. The arguments used by these three kinds in respect to their 
faith according to Averroes are also different. The Jumliur uses 
rhetorical arguments (Kliitabiyyat), This type of argument according 
to Averroes neither uses complicated reasoning nor allegorical in­
terpretation of the Quran. The Mutakallimun, whose intellectual ca­
pacity is higher than the jumhur, uses dialectical arguments (jada- 
liyyat). This type of proof is based on many logical premises used 
to reach a conclusion. The group of \ilama’ uses demonstrative ar­
guments (burhan) which are different from the two aforementioned 
types of argument. It is distinguished from statements which are not 
demonstrative by being considered in the genus of science which is 
under investigation. Thus demonstrative arguments according to 
Averroes are "those statements which can be subsumed under the defi­
nition of this genus of science of which comprise in their defini-
47tion of tliis genus of science." These demonstrative arguments are
hard to leam and need much time even for those who qualified to 
48leam them. Thus these arguments are very rare. Averroes re­
garded this type of proof as the highest and its value in relation 
to otilers is "as unalloyed gold to the other minerals and tlie pure 
pearl to tlie other jewels.Accordingly, Averroes said, we can­
not explain this type of proof to the mass e s . The teaching of 
shar^ , which contains all three levels of arguments, is concerned
Clmore with the masses, because they are the majority group, however, 
it also does not neglect the learned (Khawas). Therefore the prevai­
ling methods of expression in sliar** are the common methods by which
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52the majority comes to form a concept and a judgement.
Hie duty of the masses is to accept the exterior meaning of
the Quran, and we cannot expose its hidden meaning to them through
— 53the method of allegorical interpretation (ta’wil), because ex­
posing it for them would destroy their faith.
If al-Kindi (d,873 A.D.) recommended and practised the method
of interpretation, Averroes also used it in his interpretation of
shar^, but he did not permit its use freely.He underlines some
condition.For example, we cannot make any interpretation if the
meaning of the Quran is quite clear, but we can do it if its meanings
are in the form of illustrations. According to Averroes, the task to
interpret the illustrations mentioned in the Quran are only for the 
57philosophers, because they use demonstrative arguments - the highest
level for the human mind with respect to faith^ and demonstrative argu­
ments do not lead to a conflict with what is given by shar‘d (Quran). 
Furtliermore, Averroes mentioned tliat if unanimous agreement (ijma^ ) is 
reached by unexceptionable means (tariq yaqiniy), such a result allows 
no further interpretation. If^ however^ the agreement on a particular
problem is a matter only of opinion (zanniy), then further interpre- 
59tation is valid.
Averroes in his theological discussions was very concerned 
for the masses lest their belief contradict revelation. He explained 
any concept of God according to their capacity of thingking. He 
based this idea on a tradition of the prophet Tkahammad who said, 'We, 
the prophets, have been commanded to adapt ourselves to the conditions 
of the people, and address them according to their intelligence."
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This is because they do not believe a thing except insofar they can 
imagine it.^ ^ He criticized theologians (mutakallimun) who expounded 
interpretations of ambiguous verses to them, the masses.
Averroes devoted half of his life in bringing together more 
closely philosophy and religion. He regarded them as "two biothers 
who sucked a single railk",^  ^ and helped each other for the happi‘- 
ness of human beings. One of his purposes in reconciling philosophy 
and religion was to preserve the unity of truth between philosophy 
and the revealed law (shar^ ) without sacrificing one or the other.
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C. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
Thomas Aquinas was the single most significant Christian 
philosopher-theologian in the Middle Ages. Owing to his high intel­
lectual ability, he was regarded even by his opponents such as Siger 
of Brabant, as of the outstanding philosophers of the time. He also 
was acknowledged as the prince of the thrteenth century theologians. 
He did not only expound theological teaching and give new and comp­
rehensive solutions to a multitude of questions but above all he 
co-ordinated the material of Catholic theology in a monumental sys­
tem which has won the admiration of posterity.
He was born early in the year of 1225 at the castle of 
Reccasecca, near the small town of Aquino:, which was situated between 
Naples and Rome. He was of noble birth, his family holding a high 
position in the society of Aquino. His father, Landulf, count of 
Aquino was of Lombard nobility, and his mother, Theodora, was a 
noble woman from Naples and of Norman origin.
At the age of five years (1230) he was sent by his parents 
to Monte Cassino in the hope that he would become a Benedictine 
monk.^^ The teaching at Monte Cassino was basically religious, but 
it also involved learning Latin and Vernacular grammar, reading, 
writing, elementary mathematics and harmony.
After nine years of elementary studies at Kfonte Cassino, he 
was sent to the University of Naples in the Faculty of Arts. This 
was because King Frederik II was involved in a quarrell with the 
Pope, and some of the monks were expelled from Monte Cassino.
■' I
- 23 -
Aquinas matriculated at the University of Naples in 1239.
There he studied the seven liberal arts of grajmer, logic, rhetoric, 
arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy. At the University, he 
was trained under several teachers including Master Martin (d.l278) 
for grammer and logic, Peter of Ireland (d.l260) for natural philo­
sophy, and others. Peter of Ireland was very important not only in 
introducing Aristotelianism but also Averroism to Aquinas. This is 
because Peter of Ireland took his Aristotelianism with large infu­
sions of Averroism.He certainly used Scouts' translations of 
Averroes, and held him in high regard.
It is a historical fact that the role of King Frederick II 
in translating the work of Aristotle and commentaries of Averroes 
was important. He disposed of a large collection of Arabic manus­
cripts, including the workd of Aristotle and Averroes which he cau­
sed to be translated.These works were used in the curriculum at 
Naples; even in his court the doctrines of Averroes were well known 
and discussed.
Michael Scot (d.l235) and Herman the German (d.l272) were 
among those who played a direct and important part in the Latin trans­
lations. They translated fifteen out of the thirty eight titles of 
Averroes' works. This means that Aquinas had already been exposed 
to Aristotle's and Averroes' works before entering the University of 
Paris.
IVliile he was studying at Naples, he joined the Dominican 
70Order, and became a friar in 1244. This step was by no means £ 
ceptable to his family, who no doubt wished him to become a
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Benedictine oblet. Talcing the Dominican habit in 1224 he was on 
his way to Paris when he was kindapped by his brother and held in 
custody for about one year. IVhen released, he proceeded to Paris 
in 1245.
In the thirteenth century, the University of Paris was the
foremost university in the field of theology which was regarded as
71the queen of sciences and speculative philosophy. In the middle 
of the t^drteenth century many of Aristotle's writings on scientific 
subjects came to be known in the west, partly through Arabic trans­
lations and partly through translations from the,Greek original. 
Though, at the beginning, Aristotle's natural philosophy was prohi­
bited at the University of Paris, about 1255, however, all the known
72works of Aristotle were being lectured on at Paris.
At the University, Aquinas studied theology and Aristotelia­
nism in the Faculty of Arts under Albert the Great. Here, Aquinas 
for the second time was exposed to Aristotelianism and Averroism. 
Averroes was a useful friend of Albert's philosophical youth, and 
when Averroes' works were introduced to the Latin west through the
Latin translations of Michael Scot, one of the very first to meet 
75was St. Albert. This inevitably, was more or less Averroes' in­
fluence on Albert where, for example, seventy precise quotations 
from Averroes appear in Albert's Summa de Creaturis.^^ When Aquinas 
was trained under Albert, there was a probability that Averroism was 
exposed to hbn.
Aristotelianism, which was lectured at the University, was 
more developed and stronger in the Faculty of Arts than the Theology
25 -
Faculty. This was because in the Theology Faculty the Bible and
75the Sentences of Peter Lombard were the text books, while the 
writings of Aristotle were the fundamental text books in tlie Facul­
ty of Arts. In addition to Aristotelianism, there were also many 
writings of Arabic philosophers such as Avicenna and Averroes. 
Averroes' works began to penetrate into the University of Paris 
about 1230, and Avicenna’s works penetrated even earlier than that.
After three years studying at Paris, Aquinas proceeded to
study theology at Cologne (1248 - 1252} where he was also under
Albert the Great. After he completed his studying at Cologne, he
returned to Paris to teach there as a 'bachelor' on the scriputre,
and on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. While he was a 'bachelor' he
made commentaries on the Sentences.This was his first work where
we find in it all the most characteristic elements of his philoso- 
77phy. During his first period in Paris he also wrote a part of 
Questiones di Quôdlibet. Besides lecturing and taking part in 
disputations, Aquinas, even though still only a 'bachelor', wrote 
two short monographs at the request of the Dominican colleagues.
At the end of 1225 Aquinas received his licence to teach in 
theology, but he may not have begun teaching until the following 
academic year, because his master licence had not been formally 
recognized by the University. The reason for this delay was the 
dispute between the secular clergy and the new religious orders.
At that time anti-Dominican feelings in Paris were so strong that
79the priory needed a guard of royal troops twenty four hours a day.
80The campaign was carried on in Paris against the medicants, parti­
cularly against the Dominicans, who were still excluded from the
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consortium of masters,Aquinas, however, presided over the incep­
tion of his sucessor in the Cominican chair for foreigners in 1259.
During Aquinas’ first three years at Paris as a Master in
theology, he was to lecture on texts draivn from the Bible, namely
Isaiah and Mattew. In this period also, he began, possibly in 1258,
82to write Summa Contra Gentiles, and completed it in 1264, His
writing was a synthesis covering the entire range of Catholic truth
specially for defending the faith apparently for the use of the
Dominicans in Spain. Thiw work was suggested by the Master General
83of the Dominican Order, Raymond Renafort [d,1275), who evangelised
non-Christians in Spain and North Africa. In addition, Aquinas wrote
this work with a full awareness of the development of Arabian Aristo-
84telianism in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris. Tlie 
influence of Aristotle's teaching and Averroes' writing, as mentioned 
before, had been developed at the University of Paris. From 1210 to 
1265 Aristotelianism had developed continuously in the Faculty of 
Arts and then in the Theology Faculty. In 1255 all the Imown works 
or Aristotle were placed on the syllabus for the Faculty of Arts.
At that time Siger of Brabant (c.l235 - 1282) was a leader
of Latin Averroism,who developed Aristotle's teaching and an
87Averroistic doctrine in the Faculty of Arts. So Aquinas as a 
Master of Theology was responsible to block what were considered 
dangerous philosophical proclivities in the Faculty of Arts. In 
fact, Aquinas did not oppose all of Aristotle's works, but he tried 
to show that they were not in contradiction to the Christian dogma. 
Aguinas was trying to be a good Aristotelian and a good Christian
Q Oat the same time. Aquinas tried to interpret Aristotle’s works
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according to Christianity, and not to follow Arabic commentators,
especially Averroes, tliough he regarded him as the best exponent of
the Aristotelian text and the supreme master in logic, but heretical
89in his metaphysics and philosophy. As a matter of fact, Aquinas
took many things from Averroes as did Albert the Great from Avicenna,
but he approached the text of Ibn Rashd (Averroes) in quite a dif-
90feront frame of mind.
Summa Contra Gentiles consists of four books; the first 
book deals witli the nature of God, the second concerns the created 
world, the third explains the way in which rational creatures are 
to find their happiness in God, and the fourth is devoted speci­
fically to Christian doctrine such as the Trinity, the incarnation 
and the like. One of Aquinas' aim in writing Summa Contra Gentiles 
was to show that the Christian faith is built on a rational founda­
tion and that the principles of philosophy do not necessarily lead 
to a view of the world which excludes Christianity either implicitly 
or explicitly. Aquinas himself mentions this as follows:
"I have set myself the task of making known, as far as my 
limited power will allow, the truth that the Catholic faith 
professes, and of setting aside the errors that are opposed 
to it." 91
Tliomas did not finish his Summa Contra Gentiles in Paris
because in 1259 he returned to Italy. He remained there for nine
years, and during that time he completed it. While Aquinas was in
92Rome in 1266 he started to write the Summa Theologiae which was 
Aquinas' longest and most important contribution to the science of 
theology.
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The Siunma Theologiae, divided into three parts, was written
for beginners in the study of theology to replace the Sentences of 
93Peter Lombard. The first part discusses the subject of God and 
creation, tlie second was subdivided into two parts; Prima Secundae 
concerns mans's moral life, and Secunda Secundae deals with parti­
cular virtues and vices ; and the third is concerned with strictly 
theological topics, such as the Trinity, the Sacrament, £ind the 
like. Aquinas continued his writing in his second period in Paris 
(1266 - 1272) and during his life in Naples. It, however, was not
finished, and was completed after his death by the historian Tolomeo 
94of Lucca.* In both Suramas there are many similar discussions, name­
ly, what is already discussed in the Summa Contra Gentile is dis­
cussed again in the Summa Theologiae, but the discussions dealt with 
the Summa Contra Gentiles are more philosophical than in the Summa 
Theologiae.
In 1268 Aguinas was recalled to Paris where the academic 
situation had become serious. This was because the Averroist group 
which was led by Siger of Brabant rose up in the University of Paris. 
Hie philosophical movement in the Faculty of Arts was becoming in­
creasingly independent, rationalistic and daring, which finally lead 
to Siger's doctrines being condemmed by the Bishop of Paris in 1270 
and 1277. Aquinas, in fact, did not only face the Averroist group 
but also the traditional theologians called tlie August ini ans who 
were led by William of St. Amour.
In his second Parisian period Thomas wrote many polemical 
writings against the secular masters. For example, there was "On
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the Unity of the Intellect" against Averroist which was particularly 
aimed to attack Siger of Brabant who threatened to secure the trirmip 
of Averroes in the Faculty of Arts under the colours of Aristotle, 
and so to compromise the whole peripatetic movement. This was writ­
ten in 1270. To refute the attack of William of St. Amour, Aquinas 
wrote Contra Impugnater Dei Cultum et Religionem. In the same period 
Aquinas made commentaries on Aristotle. A part of his commentaries 
were done at the end of his life in Naples, that was between 1268 - 
1273. Some of his commentaries on Aristotle were based on a text of 
William of Moerbecke (1215 - 1286), a friend of Aquinas.
During Aquinas’ last year in Paris, a strong bond of mutual 
understanding and friendship had developed between Aquinas and a 
large number of masters and students in the Faculty of Arts. Aquinas 
even had a strong following in the Faculty of Arts from 1270 onwards. 
After the anti-mendicant contraversy, Latin Averroist and opposition 
from Augustinist had subsided, Aquinas was recalled back to Italy by 
the master general John of Vercelli for the puiqiose of errecting a 
Dominican ’Studium General’ in Nepals. So Aquinas relinaquished his 
professorial chair and returned to Italy in 1274. He continued his 
professorial activity there until the end of 1273. Aquinas stopped 
writing and dictating while he was celebrating Mass in the chapel of 
Nicholas on 6th December 1273. He said, "I can do no more, such 
things have been revealed to me that everything I have written seems 
to me rubbish.
Briefly, Aquinas devoted nearly half of his life in the 
academic field as a dedicated theologian as well as a philosopher.
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writing and commenting on many aspects of theology and philosophy.
97In a short time he produced a large number of works, but two of 
them. The Summa Contra Gentiles and The Summa Theologiae, are the 
most important of his works.
Mien Pope Gregoiy X summoned him to attend the Second Council 
at Lyons in 1274, he did not complete his journey because his health 
did not permit it. On the way he stopped at the court of Countess 
Francesca. He stayed there for four days, and at the end he was 
transferred to the neighbouring monastery of St. Maria at Fossanova. 
He died there on the 7th of March 1274. He was forty nine years of 
age at the time of his death, having behind him a life devoted to 
study aild teaching. Aquinas was canonized as a saint on the 18th of 
July, 1323 by Pope John XXII as a model not only in sanctity but also 
in doctrine.
Although he did not have a long life, he made many contri­
butions to Christian doctrine, and many of his writings were a source 
of reference for Christians. His influence, which was considerable 
in the centuries following his death, reached a new peak in 1878
when Pope Leo XIII recommended the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas as
98a model for Catholic thought.
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D. AQUINAS' RECONCILIATION OF ARISTOTELIANISM AND CHRISTIANITY
In the 13th. centuiy, the University of Paris, espicially the
Faculty of Theology, was tlie centre of higher studies in Christendom.
The important texts for students in the Faculty of Theology were the
"Bible" and the "Sentences of Peter Lombard", They were trained as
theologians who would defend the authority of Orthodox Christianity.
For the function of a medieval master in theology was threefold; to
lecture on some of the books of the Bible, to resolve questions up
for discussion in tlie schools, and to preach the Word of God to the
99clergy and the laity.
Until about tlie 12th. century the ideology of Christianity 
had been without any serious rival. But the introduction of 
Aristotle's thought into the west created a wholly new situation. 
Christians were shaken in the 13th century by the massive importation 
of non-Christian philosophical literature.
The rise of Aristotelianism could not be controlled in the 
west. Hie work of Aristotle, dealing with natural philosophy to­
gether with his books on metaphysics, ethics and psychology, become
100known in the west at once upon its importation. Soon, Aristote­
lianism began to be established in the Faculty of Arts of the Uni­
versity of Paris. In 1252 a new statuet of the Faculty of Arts 
placed all the known writings of Aristotle on the lecture programme, 
and this Faculty, which traditionally taught the seven liberal arts, 
become a practicing - school of Aristotelian philosophy. Soon after 
1260 a number of Masters of the Faculty of Arts began to expound 
Aristotle, whom they regarded as the embodiment of philosophical
32
wisdom.
A group of young masters, led by Siger Braban (ca.l235 - 
1282), taught the philosophy of Aristotle without concerning them­
selves with tJie opposition which existed between philosophy and 
Qiristian doctrine. From the 13th. century onwards the Faculty of 
Arts had become a Faculty of Philosophy, where Aristotle’s philoso­
phy was taught in its entirety.The Masters in the Faculty of 
Arts tended to develop their own teaching independently of the 
theological faculty. They wished their commentaries also to be 
philosophical, critical, and in this way different from the clerical 
commentaries of theologians. They claimed an authority of Aristotle's 
teaching, not on Holy Writ but based solely on reason.
During Aquinas' time the trouble was that some theologians
wanted to theologize in philosopliy, whereas some philosophers
102wanted to philosophize in theology. Consequently, the only way 
to resolve that conflict was, for Aquinas to handle philosophical 
problems as a philosopher and theological problem as a theologian.
Not only Aquinas, but also all the great theologians of 
the 13th centuiy were aware on the danger of Aristotle’s doctrine.
Hiey had been careful either to reject and argue against Aristotelian 
theories which they considered incompatible with Christian doctrine, 
or to interpret Aristotle’s thought in such a way that it appeared 
to entail conflicting theories.
In order to prevent an extension of the influence of 
Aristotle’s reaching, some proscription^^^ had been undertaken by
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the council of Paris beginning in 1210 and continuing until its
105ultimate condeiraiation in 1270 and 1277. The prohibition, however, 
was not effective. Aristotelianism continued to develop and spread 
to other places. In 1229, for example, the Professors of Toulouse, 
in order to attract students, issued a notice saying tliat lectures 
could be allowed there on the work of Aristotle.
Aristotelian thought was not a new thing for Aquinas, be­
cause by the time that he began his teaching career at the University 
of Paris the Aristotelian philosophy had been laiown to the medieval 
Christian world. But during his second Parisian (.1269 - 1272) the 
conflict between the Aristotelians and theologians was reaching a 
climax. He could not close his eyes to, nor have a negative atti­
tude toward the development of Aristotelianism. The desirability of 
attempting reconciliation between the Aristotelian system with 
Christian theology was clear to Aquinas. He, at the hight of his 
theological career, devoted a decade to the interpretation of 
Aristotle.For him to reject the Aristotelian system could mean 
rejecting the most powerful and comprehensive intellectual synthesis 
known to the medieval world, and to accept it totally would mean 
accepting ideas which contradicted Christian doctrine. In order to 
solve this problem he had to make his own commentary upon Aristotle,
because the philosophy of Aristotle was not the product of a
107Christian thinker, nor had it sprung from Christian culture.
The immediate danger to Aquinas’ thought arose from the 
Faculty of Arts. The Masters in that faculty were not friars or 
priests and had no theological training. Theoretically they had no 
authority to teach any part of philosophy that impinged upon divi­
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103nity. For this reason Aquinas was not confident that the com­
mentary on Aristotle made by Masters of the Faculty of Arts was not 
in contradiction with traditional Christianity. For Christian 
thinkers to learn philosophy from Aristotle was a dangerous proce­
dure. To learn it from commentaries done by Arab philosophers, such 
as Averroes, was to suprose that this philosophy was exactly what 
Aristotle had taught in the 4th century before Christ,
Aquinas feared that the Aristotelian current which had been 
established in the Faculty of Arts would spread at least to the 
Faculty of Theology, because the professors of that faculty were 
all fomer students and often foimjer professors of. the Faculty of 
Arts, Everybody had to pass through the Faculty of Arts before 
starting the higher studies of theology,Aquinas was well aware 
that he would have to attack the Masters from the Faculty of Arts 
on tlieir own ground - that of philosophy. How, then, could Chris­
tianity assimilate the philosophy of Aristotle without destroying 
either itself or philosophy?
Aquinas was primarilly a theologian and was committed to 
Christian doctrine, but he also tried to be a good Aristotelian at 
the same time. Aquinas, whom the church had proclaimed Doctor par 
excellence, was not content with transferring the entire philoso­
phy of Aristotle to the domain of Christian tliought, but he adopted 
it so far as adaptation was consistent with theological orthodoxy. 
This required him to transform Aristotelian philosophy in a radical 
way, because as a theologian he could receive the historical 
Aristotle into Christianity only through some such mediating step.
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Aquinas' task in his commentary on Aristotle was to show that
there was in peripateticism a philosophy which was truly autonomous
and independent of dogma but wliich could nevertheless be reconciled
with dogma. Thus, he has to explain some of Aristotle's doctrines
which are unaceptable in Christianity. For example, according to
111Aristotle God does not know anything other than Himself, while in
Christianity, as Aquinas says, God, in addition to knowing Himself,
112also loiows other things.
Aquinas interpreted Aristotle' tliought carefully. He used 
it more creatively, systematically, and with a more specific recog­
nition of the harmony between what Aristotle said and the Christian 
faith. When Aristotle's thought conflicts with Christian doctrine 
or seems to lead to conclusions which are incompatible with Chris­
tianity, Aquinas tends to interpret him in the most favourable light 
from the Christian point of view. He brought together into a formi­
dable synthesis the insight of classical philosophy and Christian
theology. Referring to the role of Aquinas in his commentary on
113Aristotle, Jacques Maritain concludes aptly:
"He welded it into a powerful and harmonious system he ex­
plored its principles, cleared its conslusions, enlarged 
its horizon; if he rejected nothing, he added much, en- 
ridling it with the immense wealth of Latin Christian 
tradition, restoring in their proper places many of Plato's 
doctrines, on certain fundamental points opening up en­tirely new perspectives, and thus giving proof of a philo­sophic genius as mighty as that of Aristotle himself". 114
As a matter of fact, Aquinas recognized the significance of 
philosophy and science as a basis for the Christian faith and for 
developing the capacities of human intellect. He believed that 
there is a true philosophy and a false philosophy. Philosophy is
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true only insofar as the reason that has developed it was strengthened 
by some supernatural aid; but if reason is left to itself without any 
supernatural help, it leads inevitably to error.
Thomas strongly believed that both Plato and Aristotle had
demonstrated the existance of one true God, however much they may
have erred in describing His nature and providence. For Aquinas,
demonstration of the existence of God was reached by "only a few men
115and even so after a long time and mixed with many mistakes."
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CHAPTER TWO 
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A. GENERAL DOCTRINE OF GOD IN AVERROES AND AQUINAS
In his theological discussion concerning God, Averroes gave 
more consideration to the masses than to the intellectuals. All 
proofs in which he discusses God are acceptable by both. However, 
we find also many intellectual arguments in his Taliafut al-Taliafut, 
which are not easily understood by the common people. This is be­
cause Tahafut al-TaJiafut is written to refute an attack given by an 
intellectual, namely Al-Gliazali.
The reason why Averroes gave more consideration to the mas­
ses in his theological arguiients, is that they are the majority of 
people and tlie teaching of divine law (shar^ ) concerns them.^  They 
have no high intellectual capacity to understand complicated tilings. 
Their intellectual reach does not extend beyond their imagination,
2and when they cannot imagine something it is non-existent for them.
3For this reason Averroes stressed repeatedly that they should accpet 
the exterior meaning of the Quran, and intellectuals are unable to 
expose any of its allegorical meanings to them.
As we have been, Averroes stated that philosophy is not op­
posed to revelation, since philosophy examine everything whicli is 
contained in scripture. If it is found to agree with reason, then 
it is more perfect loiowledge, and if reason does not perceive its
4truth, its cause is the defective human intellect.
Averroes did not explain in detail how human intellect is 
able to know God, but he stressed that the first knowledge which 
someone should have is the knowledge of the Creator’s existence,  ^
and the nature of observing the universe which leads to the Imow-
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ledge (ma^ rifat) of God lias been implanted in himian intellect.^
Human intellect, according to him, can perceive the forms of exis­
tence whether they are sensible existence (ivujud maJisus) or intel­
ligible existence (wujud ma^qul).^
The nature of the recognition of the existence of God in the 
human mind is mentioned in the Quran, "Am I not your Lord? They 
said, Yes, we testify."  ^ The purpose of scripture, he said, is to 
teach true science and right practices. True science is the know- 
ledge of God, and of other things as they are, and the knowledge of 
happiness and misery in the next life.^
In his Tahafut al-Tahafut and Tafsir Ma Ba^d al-Tabi^at, 
Averroes refered to God as the First Principle, the First Mover, 
the Pure Intellect and the First Intellect. This is because he
discussed God from a philosophical point of view, as Aristotle did,
while in Fasl al-Maqal and Al-Kashf he only refered to God's one 
name, Allaii, in order that it should not confuse the masses. In his 
commentary on Aristotle, Averroes deduced the nature of God from the 
fact that He is the Unmoved Mover, and as such He is free from potency
and in no wise existing in matter. He is eternal, a substance and
actuality, absolutely simple and indivisible. In other words. He is 
Pure Act, without any admixture of potency, unable to in any respect 
other than He is, and necessarily existing. He is also the final 
cause of all things, moving them as tlie desired object of their love.
The meaning of Pure Intellect, according to Averroes, is the 
system whicli exists in this universe, its cause and its source.
So God bestows on the existent, the order and system in their acts.^ ^
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God a Pure Intellect has all the perfect qualities. Averroes
affirmed these qualities which are also mentioned in the Quran:
12knowledge, life, power, will, hearing, sight and speech. The pro­
blem in Islamic theology is whether these attributes are identical 
with essence or additional (za’id) to it. The Ash'*arit e s said 
that the essence and attributes are two different things, that is, 
attributes are superadded to essencewhile the Mu^tazilites^^ 
hold that essence and attributes are one thing.As for Averroes, 
his opinion tends to the Mu^tazilites. This is because he believed 
that the method of the philosophers regarding the First Principle 
is nearer to that of the Md^tazilites.^^
Averroes argued that if these attributes are of a necessary 
existence (waj ib al-wujud), and the essence also ia a necessary 
existence, then necessary existence would be more than one. This 
is impossible for God's uniqueness would be denied. The discussion 
of the relation between essence and attributes is one not easily un­
derstood by the common people. So Averroes stressed that they should 
recognize the existence of those attributes without going into de­
tail
Averroes said that we do not know the attributes of God ex­
cept by two means : by the way of likeness, and by the way of trans­
cendence.^^  By the former we affirm that God has positive attri­
butes (sifat ijabiyyat) as human beings have, and by the latter, we 
deny all deficienies in God.
The likeness between God and creature, according to Averroes, 
is understandable in two senses. First, the Creator (God) does not
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have attributes which belong to the creature. Secondly, the Creator
also has attributes which belong to the creature, but in a more per-
20feet ctnd superior way. In other words, the attributes which exist
in the Creator are of another mode than that which is in the creature.
Averroes refered to a Quranic verse which clearly states the trans-
21cendence of God, "Like Him there is naught." lYhat is predicated of 
God and creature is analogical, not in a univocal or pure equivocal 
sense.
When we say that God and man share the same kind of attri­
butes, this does not mean that God's attributes and man's are exact­
ly the same, and it also does not mean that they are totally diffe­
rent. For man is said to be perfect when he has attributes such as 
loiowledge, life, will, power and the like. This perfection belong­
ing to man is related to God, but that which is in God is more per­
fect and superior. What is predicated to God and man is the same 
in name (ishtirak al-ism) but not in reality. This is the signi­
ficance of a tradition of the prophet Miiammad, according to Averroes, 
that God created Adam according to His form.
In his commentary on Aristotle's view that God is simple, 
Averroes interiDreted this to mean that God is not composed of some­
thing. That which is composed is changeable. This is impossible
23with God for He does not undergo any change. ‘ Since God is not a 
composite thing, He is not a body. In other words we should deny 
all anthropomorphism in speaking of God. Yet there are many verses 
in the Quran which use anthropomorphism in speaking of God. For 
example, "He sat Himself upon the throne," 24, "yet still abide the
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25Face of the Lord, majestic, splendid." Averroes tried to solve 
this problem.
According to Averroes Quranic texts do not deny firmly the 
corporeality of God. They make no mention of it, but what is clear 
for us is that affirmation of corporeality of God is nearer than 
their negation.Averroes' general approach was to follow the pat­
tern of divine law (shar*) which does not affirm or deny the anthro-
pomorphisin. of God is its declaration to the masses. If asked we
27should answer that there is nothing like luito Him. This is the
same as what had happened to Malik ibn Anas when he spoke about
God's sitting upon the throne. He said, "The sitting is Icnown, its
manner is unknoivn. the belief in it is necessary and asking ques-
£ 28tions about it is innovation (bid at)."
29Averroes gave three reasons why it is forbidden to des­
cribe the anthropomorphism of God to the masses:
(1) It is difficult to understand it.
(2) The masses cannot imagine something which has no body; 
so when they are told that there exists one who has
no body, their imagination cannot comprehend it.
(3) If the scripture denies anthropomorphism altogether 
tliere would arise many doubts about what has been 
said concerning the Day of Judgement.
Averroes also said that God is eternal and infinite. For 
everything that has an end must liave begun and what does not begin
54
does not end. This can also be luidcrstood from the fact that begin­
ning and end are correlatives. Tlierefore, one who affirms that what
30has no end has no beginning.
If God does not have these two qualities, eternal and infi­
nite, it means He is not the Pure Act or tlie First Principle which 
is the cause of source of all beings, that will be proved later.
Like Averroes, Aquinas also recognized that philosophy and 
revelation are not opposed to one another. Some knowledge of the 
nature of God is attainable through philosophy. Man, by using in­
tellect, is able to laiow God. On this depends the ultimate felicity
31of man. Man’s ultimate beatitude is to know God. The divine sub­
stance, according to Aquinas, is not beyond the capacity of the 
created intellect in such a way that it is altogether foreign to it.
In fact the divine substance is the first intelligible object and
32the principle of all intellectual cognition.' Aquinas said that the
fact that we are able to laiow something of God from creation is based
on the fact that creation, as aji effect of God, must manifest God,
though it can do this only imperfectly. Aquinas remained covinced
of the fact that the divine essence in itself transcends the grasp
of the human mind, and therefore, transcends all human representation
of figurative description. "If we imagine what something is, then
God is beyond it; if we can grasp the definition of a certain thing,
33then that thing is. not yet God".
According to Aquinas there are two fundamental ways by which 
we can Icnow God’s nature. Both move from our understanding of things 
in the natural world to a description of God, and though neither
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gives an exact and exhaustive comprehension of God's nature, each 
gives us trustworthy insights.
The first is Imoivn as the negative way. It, according to 
Aquinas, is a mode of expressing the transcendence of God's perfec­
tion, which is recognized to be beyond any concept man may form 
either from material or spiritual beings.We are unable to appre­
hend the divine essence by knowing what it is, yet we are able to
35have some knowledge of it by knowing what it is not.' For example, 
if we say that God is incorporeal, we can distinguish Him from many 
other beings. By denying His coporeality we form some notion of 
His nature, since on this basis we Icnow He is not body. Rirther- 
more, this concept gives us a positive idea of what the divine sub­
stance is in itself, and the more predicates we deny of God, the 
more we approximate to a loiowledge of Him. The second is the 
affirmative way. Some predicates such as goodness or wisdom func­
tion more affirmatively and directly in our description of God. 
Tliough Aquinas insisted on the negative aspect of some of God's at­
tributes, he did not mean to disregard positive attributes predi­
cated of God. In fact, the negative and the positive attributes 
virtually go together. There can be no validity in theolog)^  if the 
negative and positive are not used together, "The positive way
alone leads to anthropomorphism, to idolatry, to blasphemy. The
37negative way alone leads to agnosticism and atheism."
To avoid confusion in describing God's nature through the 
affirmative way Aquinas said that some predicates attributed to God 
are not univocal,nor equivocal,but analogical. For Example,
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when we say that a man is wise, and that God is wise, the predicate 
"wise" is not to be understood in a univocal sense, that is in pre­
cisely the same sense. Our concept of wisdom is drawn from crea­
tures, and if we apply precisely this concept to God, we should be 
saying something false about God, since God is not, and cannot be 
wise in precisely the same sense in which a man is wise. On the 
other hand, the names we apply to God are not purely equivocal, they 
are not entirely and completely different in meaning from the meaning 
they bear when applied to creatures. So the way we can reach the 
knowledge is analogical in character. Analogy is a principle which 
must be properly interpreted and proportionately adapted to each 
particular order of knowledge.
The foundation of all analogies employed by Aquinas is the 
likeness of creatures to God. Mien an attribute is predicated 
analogically of two different things, this means that it is predi­
cated according to the relation of the one to another, cind Aquinas 
said that creatures have a real relation to G o d . T h e  example given 
by Aquinas is the word "healtli". An animal is said to be healthy 
because it is a subject of health, while medicine is said to be
healthy as being the cause of health, and a complexion is said to
42be healthy as being the sign of health. Moreover, Aquinas said 
that "We cannot speak of God at all except in the language we use 
of creatures, and so whatever is said both of God and creatures is 
said in virtue of the order that creatures have to God as to their 
source and cause in which all the perfection of things pre-exist 
transcendentally."'^  ^ So, in analogical predication, the predicate 
is applied to God and to creatures neither in precisely the same
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sense nor in a totally different sense. According to Aquinas' in­
terpretation of tlie relationship between God and creature, finite 
reality points to God, since it is caused by God. Being caused by 
God, it bears some similarities to Him because every effect resembles 
its cause. Aquinas, however, insists that while we admit that in 
some way the creature resembles God, we must in no way say that God 
resembles the creature, such as we would call a portrait a likeness 
of man, but not vice-versa.This is because the creature manifests 
God only imperfectly. This is Aquinas' interpretation of a phrase 
in the scripture, "let us make man in our image, after our likeness.
We do not find dissimilarity between Averroes' and Aquinas’ 
discussion in relation to the knowledge of God and relationship bet­
ween God and creature. Both agreed that the attributes of God and 
creature are in an analogical way. But Aquinas' explanation about 
the concept of analogy between God and creature is more conplete 
and more detailed than Averroes. Averroes did not describe at 
length as Aquinas how the analogical relationship between God and 
creature arose. He just said that God's attributes and man's such 
as laiowledge, power, will and the like are the same in the name, 
and God's attributes are superior than man's.
In philosophic-theological discussions, Aquinas called God 
Pure Act, First Principle, First Mover, Final Cause and First Cause 
as Averroes did. Hiis can be seen in his treatment about the proof 
of the existence of God which will be discussed later. The simi­
larity in the name of God given by both Averroes and Aquinas is due 
to the commentaries they made on Aristotle's concept of God. Aquinas 
however, when he refered to the scriptures,just called God one
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54and His attributes are the same. This is parallel to Averroes' 
statement, but the reasons each gave are different. Aquinas held 
that if God's attributes were not His essence, there should be some­
thing outside of His essence. Tills would mean that there is compo­
sition in God's essence, but composition in God's essence is impos­
sible.^  ^ Moreover, Aquinas said that each of God's qualities such 
as wisdom, goodness, and the like is the divine essence itself and 
so all are one in reality.
Aquinas concluded his discussion of the concept of the sim­
plicity of God by saying that He is not composed of extended parts, 
since He is not a body, nor of form and matter, nor does He differ 
from His own nature, nor His nature from His existence, nor can one 
distinguish in Him genus and difference, nor s dis tance accidents.
It is clear, then, that there is no way in which God is composite,
57and He must be altogether simple. In supporting his discussion of 
God's simpleness Aquinas quoted Augustine who said "God is the most 
truly simple thing there is," If God is Pure Act and the source of 
all beings. He must be perfect. Everything that is imperfect must 
be preceded by something perfect. Something is perfect according as
it is in act, and God as the First Cause is always in act, as Aquinas
58had shown. So God must be perfect. Aquinas' argument that God is 
perfect does not depend merely on the logic of the philosophical con­
ception. He also refered to the verse in the scripture "You, there-
59fore, must be perfect as your heavenly father is perfect."
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B. PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
i . God's Existence is demonstrable
Averroes, in his Fasl al-Maqal, w a s  concerned with a wider 
problem; whether the philosophical method tallies with the teaching 
of revelation or not. In this matter Averroes replied in tlie affirma­
tive. For philosophy, according to him, as has been mentioned in the 
previous chapter, was nothing other than consideration of existants 
and their examination, insofar as they manifest tlie Creator. From 
this it can be seen tliat he recognized that God's existence is demons­
trable by reference to the observable world.
In his ^ an^Kashf, he distinguèshed between four theological 
sdiools on the specific problem of God's existence. They were the 
Hashawites, the Ash^arites, the Sufis and the Mu^ tazilites. Each 
had different theories concerning the divinity, and. each believed 
its views had been handed doivn from primitive Islam.
Tlie existence of God according to the Hashawites (Hashawiy- 
yat), remarked Averroes, must not be subjected to rational investi­
gation; it is only laiown by revelation (al-samf).^  ^ In other words 
they denied that the existence of God could be demonstrated by human 
intellect. This view, Averroes said, can be easily refuted, since 
the Quran^^ itself enjoins the speculative consideration of His 
existence.
The Ash^arites' view, according to Averroes, maintained that 
the existence of God lies between proper fields of reason, but in 
their proof they made use of non-Quranic methods.They started 
with proposition that the world was created which was based on the
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premise that bodies are composed of indivisible created atoms 
(ajza' la tatajazza') and that the atoms which are indivisible are 
temporal (huduth). The method, according to Averroes, is not easily 
understood, and does not lead to a belief in the existence of God.^ ^
The Sufis’ method, as Averroes observed, was not a philoso­
phical method, that is to say, it did not consists of a nuinber of 
premises and syllogisms. They maintained that knowledge is found in 
our own hearts after its detachment from all physical desire, and 
after concentrating the mind upon the desired object. This method, 
form Averroes' view, though we can accept it, is not common to all
T 66people.
As to the Mu^  tazilites, Averroes did not make many commen­
taries becaLise in many circumstances especially concerning the First 
Principle, the opinion of the philosophers was nearer to their 
vLew.^  ^ The Mu/tazilites were well Icnown as people who give more 
consideration to the intellectual.^^ In the case of God’s existence
however, their methods, according to Averroes, were like those of 
69the Asharites.
After an analysis and criticism of those theories Averroes
gave his own solution. He did so as a follower of, and commentator
on, Aristotle, Me stated that the existence of God can be demons-
70trated through physics not metapliysics as held by Avicenna. Thus
Avicenna's proof of the existence of God, according to Averroes,
71was invalid. According to him, Avicenna's proof was invalid be­
cause he followed Alexander on this point. In Alexander's view, 
the physicist could not prove the existence of the. principle of
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natural beings; the physicist could assume the principle of sensible 
beings that are posited by the metaphysician. This is wrong,
Averroes said, because the external substance is proved to be the
72first principle of natural beings in the final book of the physics.
Averroes said that physics establishes the existence of the subject
matter of metaphysics. Thus metaphysics must accept the result of
physics. That is, metaphysics must begin witli the fact of matter
73and form as the composing principle of natural beings. “ Thus the 
existence of God is properly and exclusively proved in the science 
of physics. The task of the metaphysician is to demonstrate that 
the prime mover, whose existence had already been proven in physics, 
is the principle of sensible substance in the orders of fomal and 
final causality. On this basis Averroes fimly proclaimed that 
metaphysics does not prove the existence of a first substance, rather 
it proves only that the first mover, a pure form, must be a subs­
tance, since form is the constitutive cause of substance.Thus 
metaphysics begins after the physical proof of an immaterial first 
mover. This means tliat metaphysical proof does not able to proove 
the existence of God.
Aquinas responds to these two proofs given by Avicenna and
75Averroes. He prefers Avicenna to Averroes, He, however did not 
accept totally what had been argued by Avicenna,Aquinas’ dis­
cussion of the demonstration of God's existence is found in his 
Sujnma Theologiae in question 2, article 1, in Summa Contra Gentiles 
Book 1, Cliapter 10 and 11, in Commentary on Sentence distinction 3, 
question 1, article 2, and in De Varitate question 10, article 12.
The main question put by Aquinas is whether the existence of
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God is demonstrable or not. Like Averroes, he also answered in the
affimative. Aquinas argued that the proposition "God exists" is
not self evident to us. He says a thing can be self-evident in
either of two ways; first, self-evident in itself not to us;
secondly, self-evident in itself and to us. Aquinas explained that
such a proposition becomes self-evident when the predicate of the
proposition is included in the meaning of the subject. For example,
man is an animal, since being an animal is part of the meaning of 
77man. If, therefore, the essence of the predicate and subject be 
knom to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all. If, how­
ever, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and sub­
ject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself but 
not to all or some of us. Therefore, the proposition "God exists"
is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, be-
78cause God is His o\m existence. Now because we do not know what 
God is, the proposition is not self-evident to us, but needs to be 
demonstrated by things that are better known to us. This is done 
by means of God's effects.
It is clear for us that Aquinas’ view about the proposition
"God exists" is self-evident in itself but not to us, and we need
evidence to prove the existence of God. According to Aquinas, there
are two kinds of demonstrations; firstly, by means of cause, and
79secondly by means of effect. Only the second is available to us 
in the case of a knowledge of God. This is because the effect is 
better known to us than its cause, and so we proceed from the effect 
to the knowledge of its cause. If the effect exits, the cause must 
pre-exist, since every effect depends on its cause. The existence
64 -
of God, insofar as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated 
from those of His effects which are laiown to us. The fowidation of 
this demonstration are laid in the Five Ways.
If Averroes held that the valid proof of the existence of
God is only through physics, Aquinas also agreed with him, though
in many circumstances he prefered Avicenna to Averroes. This is
because physics, according to Aquinas, studies mobile being as
mobile, while metaphysics studies whatever falls under the common
80notion of substantial being.
In fact, Aquinas, as a commentator on Aristotle, like 
Averroes, used both concepts of physics and metaphysics in proving 
that God exists. This becomes clear when we refer to his Five Ways 
where he plainly mentions in his Summa Contra Gentiles that he based 
tlie argument of the existence of God on the physic and metaphysic 
of Aristotle.
If Averroes refered to the Quran in his claim that Cod's 
existence can be demonstrated through philosophical observation 
which is comprehended from its many verses, Aquinas also did the 
same thing. He, in supporting his statement that God's existence 
is demonstrable, refered to the scripture of St. Paul which stated 
that "Ever since the creation of the world, his invisible nature, 
his etenial power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the 
things that had been madeAquinas' reference to the scripture, 
however, differs from Averroes' reference to the Quran. Averroes 
analysed his argument from the Quranic texts, while Aquinas did not 
base his argument on a scripture but used it as an authoritative
6  s
source.
According to Aquinas' view, one is able to demonstrate that 
God exists from the things that He has made, Ills effects, though 
they are not jU'oportionate to Him. Aquinas pointed out that; because 
every effect must have a cause, the existence of an effect is suf­
ficient to demonstrate the existence of its cause. Therefore, he 
argues that the existence of God can be demonstrated from Ills effects.
i i. Ave rroc s ' p roo f
Averroes in the commentary on Aristotle laid down a theory 
of motion as one of the proofs of the existence of Cod. In immy 
place in his 1 a ha fut a 1 -Taha fut ^ ^ and Tafsir Ma Ba^d al~i abihat^^  
he discussed this theory, cind explained it for the purpose of defen­
ding the view of the philosophers who had been attacked by Al-Ghazali. 
As a peripatetic philosoplier, he recognized that, this theory was valid 
as proof of the existence of God. What kind of God Who has been 
proven through this theoiy is not our concern. Since tlie theory of 
motion is drawn from Aristotle, it might only pi’ovc to be God as un­
derstood by Aristotle. God in Aristotle's system, according to mo­
dern commentators, is only the first cause of motion. For Averroes 
as a Muslim, God is the Creator, drawing forth the universe from non­
existence ( adam ) to existence (wujud) and conserving it.^ ^
According to the theoiy of motion, as Averroes observed,
85ever)' movement has a. moverbecause it is impossible, for example, 
for a saw to move itself; it has to be moved by, for example, a car­
penter. The causes which move each other cannot go to infinity, but 
must stop at a first, cause which is absolutely unmoved.These are
(M)
some principlos discussed b\' Aquinas in one of his proofs of the 
existence of (bd which will, be discussed later. This theory, liow- 
ever, will not. be discussed here because tlie argimient of motion was 
not recommended by Averroes as a proof which is acceptable by the 
masses.
The proof of motion, according to Averroes, is only suitable 
for intellectuals ( \ilama'). This proof is too complicated and too 
difficult for the masses to grasp it adequately, Averroes, as men­
tioned on his previous chapter, gave more attention to the masses 
than to the intellectuals in his discussion of Ctod, because they 
don't have a deep intellectual ability to conceive complicated things 
Averroes explained theological methods and teachings in such a way 
that the masses were able to understand it.
In the proof of the existence of God, Averroes refered di­
rectly to the Quran, because he believed that Quranic teaching is 
acceptable for all levels of hinnan understanding whether they belong 
to demonstrative, dialectical or rhetorical groups. When refered to 
the Quran he did not base his argument of the existence of God on 
logical premises which sometimes are not certain and cannot be un­
derstood by the laity. Thus he rejected proofs given by the theo­
logians (mutakallimun) such as those given by the Ash^ arites who 
based their arguments on temporal and contingent matters.
Averroes criticized the Ash'arites' proof of the existence
of God which was based on the proposition that the universe is 
87created (hadith). Tf we assume, according to Averroes, that the 
universe is created, it becomes necessary, as they say, that its
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creator must have another creator, so we can take this creator to 
be neither eternal nor created. For if we take it as created, tlien
it must require another creator, and then another, and so on to
infinity. Tliis is impossible. On the other hand if we take it as 
eternal, then it is necessary that its action, universe, must like­
wise be eternal, because created things might be dependent on the 
action of the agent. This is because their principle in this case
is that whatever is connected with created things (hawadith) is it- 
88self created. But they did not except this.
For '\verros, the proof of the existence of God by the
Ash^  arit.es was not satistactory, their principles contained many
dubious matters. So for benefit of both intellectuals and the masses
89he presented two proofs of the existence of God which he- really 
believed are beneficial for all people. Tlie two arc called provi- 
dence or God’s design (al-'inayat], and invention or creation (al- 
ikhtiri^ )
C1) Proof by providence
This proof is based on two principles; first 
that all existents (al-mawjudit) are created adaptively 
to man's existence. Secondly, tlie harmony of adaptation 
in the universe must necessarily be brought about by an 
agent, it cannot be merely the result of chance. The 
first principle, Averroes says, is self-evident. 
Furthermore, he says, when a man has examined some 
sensible objects such as the sun, the moon, and all the 
stars (which are the cause of the four seasons of day
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cmd night, of rain, water and wind) and the earth fitted 
for the habitation of man and all animals, then, he Imows 
positively that it is impossible that this harmony for 
man, animals and plants in all parts of the universe 
should arise by chance, but that it must proceed from 
someone who arranged it and made it by his attention, and
onthat is Godh For example, if man sees a stone on the 
ground in its shape fit for sitting on, and finds its 
proportion and fashion of the same kind, then ho would
91come to know that it was made by a maker who put it there.'
Again, if we see from the harmoniousness of every part of
the universe, said Averroes, that if a single one of the
heavenly bodies (al-ajram al-samawiyyat) was to stop for
92a single moment whatever is on the earth would perish."
According to Averroes, this proof is positive
(qat^ ’iy) and simple (basit)^  ^and acceptable by all. The
ground of this proof is also found in the Quran which can
be understood from many verses. For example Allah says,
"Have We not made the earth as a cradle and the mountains
as pegs? and we appointed your sleep for a rest; and we
appointed night for a garment, and we appointed day for
a livelihood. And we have built above you seven strong
ones, and we appointed a blazing lamp and have sent down
out of the rainclouds water cascading, that we may bring
94forth thereby grain and plants and gardens luxuriant."' 
Through these verses, Averroes said, we are able to 
recognize the adaptation of the parts of the universe to
()[)
9 sman’s existence.'' lor example, the sending down of rain 
in a certain quantity and at certain seasons, for the 
cultivation of the field, cannot be by chance, rather its 
cause is providence. Evidence for this concept of 
providence does not only manifest itself in the universe 
but also in human and animal organs where each organ has 
its certain function to maintain their life and existence.
Averroes’ proof in relation to intellectuals can be 
systematised as follow:
(a) The universe in all its parts is fit for the exis­
tence of man and all other beings here (minor 
premise}.
(b) All existing beings in all parts which are adapted 
to the existence of man and all other beings are 
necessarily created (major premise).
(c) The universe is created and has a maker (result)
(2) Proof of invention or creation
This proof is also based on two principles whicli
97are found potentially in all liumans by their nature.
The first principle is that all existants are created, 
and secondly, that every created tilings has an inventor 
(mukhtari )^. The first principle is quite clear in it­
self in Lhe case of animals and plants as God mentions, 
"surely those upon whom you call, apart from God shall 
never create a fly, though they banded together to do
70
9 8lit,"' Based on this verse Averroes said that if we see
organic substances and then we find life in them, we know
certainly that there is a creator and bestower of life,
99that is God. As to the skies, we know from their move­
ments which never become slackened, that they work for 
our benefit by divine providence, and they are subordinate 
to our welfare. For this point Averroes come to a conclu­
sion that such an appointed and subordinate object which 
is created by someone else is necessary.
When the first and the second principle are
combined together, we can reach a conclusion that every
existent must have an inventor. These two principles,
according to Averroes, are valid to prove that ever)'
101existent has a maker.' To support the validity of this
principle lie refered to a verse of the Quran, "Have they
not considered the dominion of the heaven and of the earth
102and what things God has created?"
The proof of invention has not many differences
compared to the first proof. The second proof mostly
103depends on the first, and there is overlaping. For 
example, the proposition "every created thing has a 
creator" in the second proof, is partly already dis­
cussed in the first proof. In Averroes’ second proof, 
though he said that it was drawn from the Quranic verses,we 
find analogical element. Such as the proposition "every 
created thing has a creator," This logical premise is 
not so easy to be understood by the masses.
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Averroes stated plainly that these two proofs are
religious proofs (shar^ )^ ^^  which, according to him, arc
105suitable both for intellectuals and the masses, the 
only difference being in details. For the masses cannot 
understand the two above mentioned arguments but only what 
they can grasp by their senses, while, for the intellec­
tuals, they cmi go further, cind learn by reasoning as well 
as leaniing by sense. h i  other words, whereas the 
masses' knowledge is based on observable and sensible 
things, the intellectuals’ knowledge is based on reasoning 
and certitude. For example, when the masses look at exis­
tent s, they only Imow that those existants are created and 
have a maker. On the other hand, when the intellectuals 
look at the universe, as men of arts, they try to under­
stand the real purpose of it. So it is quite clear that 
their knowledge about the Maker, as the Maker of the
imivcrse, is better than that of men who only Icnow it as
, 107made.
Averroes suggested that these two methods are the
correct way by whicli God invites men to a knowledge of
His existence. Therefore, he insisted that the Quixinic
verses leading to a knowledge of the existence of God are
108dependent only on the two foregoing arguments. Some
show to the argument of providence,some refer to the
argument of invention,and. some comprise both argu- 
111ments.
Tlie conclusion of the two proofs relates to the
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universe where the first proof concerns the hamoniousness 
of tlie movement of all parts of the universe, aiid the 
utility of its harmoniousness to human beings and other 
existents; the second proof shows that the universe is not 
created by itself, but by someone else - God.
Of these two proofs Averroes explained in more
detail the proof of providence than the proof of invention.
So the proof of providence, according to him, is the best
112proof of the existence of God.
Perhaps Averroes’ two proofs can be related to the 
cosmological argument, but not as the cosmological argu­
ment discussed by Aquinas which will be dealt with later. 
Averroes* proof was a result of observation of the universe 
derived from many verses of the Quran, while Aquinas' 
proof, as will be seen, consists of philosophical concep­
tion.
iii. Aquinas' proof
Aquinas presented his famous Five Ways in proving God's 
existence in his two Summas. He claims tliat his proofs are the
113same as those used by both pliilosophers and Catholic teachers."
The first three of the Five Ways are best included luider 
the well-known cosmological arguments,  ^and the background of 
these arguments is Aristotle's philosophy. The fourth argument 
points back to plato's idea of the eternal forms and also points 
foi'ward to the moral argument, i'he fifth argimient points to theo-
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logical argument.
It is not our purpose to criticize Aquinas' argument of the 
existence of God nor is it to analyse them in detail by comparing 
his thought witli that of otlier Christian philosophers whetlier his 
contemporaries or successors in recent times. The main purpose is 
to lay domr Aquinas' argument and then tiy to point out if there 
are any similarities between Averroes’ and Aquinas' proff, Aquinas' 
proofs are as follows:
1 . The first way: Argument from motion or change.
This proof is based on change,
"Some things in the world are certainly in process of change : 
til is we plainly see. Now anything in process of change is being changed by something else. This is so because it is characteristic of things in process of change that they do 
not yet have the perfection towards which they move, tliough able to have it; whereas it is characteristic of something 
causing diange to have that perfection already. For to cause change is to bring into being what was previously only 
able to be, and this can onle be done something that already is: thus fire, which is actually hot, causes woodl which isable to be hot, to become actually hot, and in this way 
causes change in the wood. Now the same thing cannot at the same time be both extually X and potentially X, though it 
can be actually X and potentially Y; the actually hot cannot at the same time be potentially hot, though it can be poten­
tially cold. Consequently, a thing in process of change 
cannot itself cause that same change; it cannot change it­
self. Of necessity therefore anything in process of change 
is being changed by something else. I\t)reover, this some­thing else, if in process of change, is itself being clianged 
by yet another thing; and this last by another. Now we must stop somewhere, otherwise there will be no first cause 
of the change, and, as a result, no subsequent causes. For 
it is only when acted upon by the first cause that interme­
diate causes will produce the diange : if the hand does notmove the stick, the stick will not move anything else.Hence one is bound to arrive at some first cause of change not itself being changed by anything, and this is what eveiy- 
body understands by God." 115
This argument is the longest of the five ways presented by
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Aquinas in his two Suiiimas. So we are not suprised that he says tliat 
it is tlie most manifest way. This is because nothing catches the 
eye and holds it more effectively than the sight of some change
... T 116taking place.
This proof is also called the Kinetological Argument or 
117argument from motion. In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas there is 
given no indication of the sources of tliis proof, but in the Summa 
Contra Gentiles he mentioned that this proof stems from Aristotle's 
physics.
The term 'motion' used by Aquinas in this proof is not mere­
l i sly change of position in space but any kind of change, including 
change of quality, such as white becoming black, and change of quan­
tity, such as increase or decrease in size.^ ^^  Aquinas' argument 
from motion is founded on his conceptions of actuality and poten­
tiality and the relation of the one to the other. The potential, 
according to him, is that which does not yet exist, but which is 
existing as tlie result of the action of an efficient cause. For 
potency does not raise itself to act. The actuality as that which 
exists itself. For example, water is actually water, but it possesses 
the power or potentiality of becoming steam. For potentiality to be­
come actuality requires an act whicli is extended to it.
120Aquinas' first way can be systematised as follows :
(a) Something is in process of change
(b) Whatever is in process of change is being changed by 
something else.
(c) Ai infinite regress of changes, each changed by another
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is impossible.
Therefore,
(cl) There is a first cause of change, itself not in process 
of change.
From these premises there are two important proposition
"that everything moved or chaiiged is moved by another," and, "that
it is impossible to go back to infinity in a series of things moving
and moved." To establish the first proposition, "that whatever
moves is moved by something else" Aquinas brought foiivard three
121reasons derived from Aristotle's physics. First, that if any­
thing moves itself, it must possess within itself the principle of 
its own motion, for otherwise it would be moved by something else. 
Secondly, whatever is moved by accident it is not moved by itself 
since it is moved by the motion of another. So too, what is moved 
by force is not moved by itself. Now whatever is moved, is moved 
through itself or by accident. Therefore, everything that is moved, 
is moved by another. Thirdly, Aquinas referai again to the concept . 
of motion, that is the same thing cannot be at once in act and 
potency with respect to the same time. But everything that is moved 
is, as such, in potency. For in motion potentiality becomes actua­
lity by the operation of something already in action. There is, 
therefore, a being who moves and changes all things, yet he himself 
is mrnoved, because he is the actuality of all things.
The second proposition, "that it is imposition to go back
to infinity in a series of things moving and moved" is an extremely
122 • - 123important point, because many have criticized this proposition.
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In establishing this second proposition Aquinas refered to the proofs
] 24given by Aristotle which are three in number.' The first, "if 
among movers and things moved we proceed to infinity, all these 
finite beings must be bodies. For whatever is moved is divisible 
and a body. But every body that moves something moved is itself 
moved while moving it. For example, when A moves B, B moves C, then 
A itself is moving while B and C are moving. Therefore, all these 
infinites (A, B, C ect.,) are moved together while one of them moves. 
But one of them is moved in a finite time. This, however, is impos­
sible that among movers and things moved, one can proceed to infinity.
Secondly, in an ordered series of movers and thing moved, when the 
first mover is removed, no other mover will move or be moved. For 
the first mover is the cause of motion for all the others. But if 
there are movers and things moved following an order to infinity, 
there will be no first mover, but all would be intermediate movers.
There none of the others will be able to be moved and thus nothing
in tlie world will be moved. This is evidently false from our obser­
vation. Thirdly, that which moves as an instrument cause cannot 
move there being a principle moving cause. But if we proceed to 
infinity among movers and things moved, all movers will be as instru­
mental cause, because they will be moved movers and there will be 
nothing as a principle mover. Therefore, nothing will bo moved.
This is also clearly false, as we know from our experience.
Aquinas employed six reasons drawn from Aristotle to validate 
two important propositions in his first way. If the two proposition 
are valid, then the conclusion, tliat "there is a first unmoved mover" 
is also valid. During the Middle Ages the first way was regarded as
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125tlie strongest of the five, however, in this way a weakness 
still exist especially when it faces new theories, for example New­
ton's first l a w . T h i s  is perhaps why the first way is said to
127have failed to solve some problem, Aquinas' first way, in fact,
is an intellectual argument which is not easily understood by the
masses, because it passes many logical premises. This perhaps is
the reason why Averroes did not accept the theoiy of motion as one
of the proofs of God's existence. It can only be understood by a
minority of people, that is the learned. This, however, does not
mean he rejected totally the concept of motion. He, as a dedicated
follower of Aristotle, gave much to a discussion of motion and
accepted that some of the premises in the theory of motion are valid.
For example, like Aquinas, he agreed that tJie infinite regress of
128causes according to philosophical doctrine is impossible. Further­
more, Averroes said no philosopher allows the existence of an infinite
number of causes. For this would imply the existence of an effect
129without cause and a thing moved without a mover.
Averroes' rejection of the theor>' of motion as a proof of 
the existence of God is not because it is invalid, but because it 
is veiy difficult for the majority of people to conceive it and 
there is certain confusion in the theory itself. And Averroes, as 
far as possible, tried to avoid any difficulty and confusion in the 
hiunan mind regarding its knowledge of God.
ii. The second way; The argument from efficient cause 
This argument runs as follows :
"This way is based on the nature of causation. In the
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observable world causes are found to be ordered in series; we never observe, nor ever could observe something causing 
itself, for this would mean it preceded itself, and this is not possible. Such a series of causes must, however, stop somewhere: for in it an earlier member causes an interme­diate and the intermediate a last. Now if you eliminate a cause you also eliminate its effect, so that you cannot have a last cause, nor an intermediate one, unless you have a first. Given therefore no stop in the series of causes, and 
hence no first cause, there would be no intermediate cause either, and no last effect, and this would be an open mistake One is therefore forced to suppose some first cause, to which everyone gives the name God." 130
Aquinas' second way is also called the Aetiological argu-
131ment, which is based on efficient causality. A thing cannot be 
its own efficient cause, tliat is to bring itself into existence. 
Aquinas used the word "cause" in a sense whidi suggests that a cause 
precedes its effect in time. An effect could not cause itself, he 
says, for this would mean it preceded itself, and so he argued that 
a present effect must have had a prior cause which must in turn have 
had a prior cause, and so go on either in an infinite regress or to 
the point at which the temporal series was launched by an uncaused 
caus e.
It is worth noticing the close resemblance of this argument
to the first way. Both seek to establish a first cause or mover on
the basis of the imposibility of going back to infinity in an ordered
132series of causes and effects. The first way starts from the fact
of motion to a prime mover; the second from causation to a first
cause. Aquinas focused the first way by attributing it to the order 
of the moving cause, whereas he specified the second way by attri­
buting it to the order of the efficient cause. Although they have 
different points of departure, beginning as they do with different
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series of effects and causes, the conclusion in each case is similar. 
Both postulate a first mover (in the first way) or a first cause 
(in the second way) , wliich is called God.
The arguments are to be seen as complementary, each demons­
tration disclosing a different aspect of divine casuality. Thus we
find that there is an overlapping between the first and the second 
133proofs, where in tlie first proof Aquinas considered things as 
being change, and in the second he considered them as active agents.
He then proceded, after excluding the liypothesis of an infinite 
regress, to draw the conclusion that there must be a first cause 
which we call God. It is, however, impossible to discuss these 
arguments profitably unless they are first understood.
135In Summa Contra Gentile " Aquinas mentioned that the second
way was also adopted from Aristotle's metaphysics, but in addition,
it is said to be dram from the Aviceimian notion of efficient
cause.According to Avicenna there is a series of causes but all
137causes are caused by the final cause. This is exactly the same
with Aquinas' concept of causality as we have seen in his second
proof of the existence of God. Avicenna’s proof is so much closer
to the proof of Aquinas. This is probably the reason, why his
second way is said not to be a physical caoncept but metaphysical 
138one. This is because, as mentioned before, Avicenna proclaims 
that tlie proof of the existence of God is only through metaphysics. 
If Aquinas’ theory of efficient casuality is really a metaphysical 
concept, then Averroes clearly rejected it as a valid proof of God’s 
existence, because he plainly denied that the concept of metaphysics
-  80 -
held by Avicenna was valid.
iii. The tliird way: Argument from necessary being.
lliis proof was based on what need not be and on what must
be.
"Some of the things we come across can be, but need not be, 
for we find them springing up and dying away, thus some­times in being and sometimes not. Now eveiything cannot be like this, for a thing that need not be, once was not; and if everything need not be, once upon a time there was 
nothing. But if that were true, there would be nothing
even now, because something that does not exist can onlybe brought into being by something already existing. So 
that if nothing was in being could be brought into being, and nothing would be in being now, which contradicts obser­
vation. Not everything, therefore, is the sort of thing 
that need not be; there has got to be something that must 
be. Now a thing that must be, may or may not owe this necessity to something else. But just as we must stop some­
where in a series of causes, so also in the series of things 
which must be and owe this to other tilings. One is forced 
therefore to suppose something which must be, and owes this to no other thing than itself; indeed itself is the cause
that other things must be." 139
This proof is called the Cosmological argimient, though it 
may quite resonably be applied to the first three, because they all 
start from an observation of the universe. Aquinas discussed this 
argument in Summa Contra Gentiles separately, that is, it is not 
under the title of God’s existence but under God's eternity.
The source of this proof, as the second, was derived from Aristotle, 
but it is even closer to Avicenna's concept of necessary being. A 
necessary being, according to Avicenna, is a being which cannot be 
caused and it is not united with any cause. Its being does not
consists in elements nor parts because elements and parts are due 
to material causes.This concept of necessary being is also 
utilised by Maimonides and then developed by Aquinas in his own
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disposition. Thus, though the concept of necessary being is related
closely to Avicenna, it is not exactly as explained by him, even in
many cases. So this concept is said to be identical with Averroes'
revision of Avicenna's proof. This is confirmed by Aquinas himself
in his remarks on the power of God where he sided with Averroes
142against Avicenna on the nature of possible necessary beings. For 
example, according to Avicenna, God alone has necessary existence.
The celestial spheres have only possible existence by their own143nature; ‘ while Averroes said that tlie spheres by their own nature 
are called necessary.In this case Aquinas stood beside Averroes 
when he said that there are many necessary beings in existence, 
and not all beings are contingent.But. the difference between 
the necessity of God and the necessity of an angel or the soul or 
celestial bodies is simply that the latter are all created by God 
ivho is defined as uncreated creator.
Aquinas' third way starts from the notion of the concept of 
contingent and necessary. The contingent being for Aquinas is a 
being subject to the natural process of generation and corruption; 
a being that is susceptible to substantial change, while a necessary 
being is in no way subject, to generation and corruption.
If we systematise Aquinas’ third way, it runs as follows
i. Some beings are necessary
A. There are things whose nature is such that it is 
possible for them to be and not to be, since they 
are under the influence of generation and corruption.
- 82 -
B. Such things cannot always exist.
C. If all reality were composed of such things, then at 
some time there would be nothing in existence.
D. If at any time there was nothing in existence, even
now nothing would exist.
E. It is clearly false to maintain that nothing exists 
now.
F. Therefore some being is necessary.
ii. Some necessary being is uncaused.
A. There are two kinds of necessary being:
(1) Necessary by another; being is necessary as long 
as its cause makes it to be.
(2) Necessary by itself (per se); self-necessitated
being is one in which its essence is existence.
B. The first sort depends on the second
C. Iherefore some necessary being is itself uncaused and
is the cause of all beings.
From the scheme above, we find that two propositions must 
be established. Firstly, some necessary being is necessary, and 
secondly, some necessary being is uncaused. In addition to tliese 
two prospos it ions, Aquinas also established another, namely, that it 
is impossible to go to infinity in necessary b e i n g s . T o  prove
tliis proposition he used the same structure as in the first and the
second proof.
Turning to Averroes, he sharply criticized the Ash^arites 
in employing the concept of necessary and possible being to prove
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that the universe is created and simultaneously to prove the exis­
tence of God. According to Averroes the Ash^arites popularised 
149three premises related to this concept. The premises are as 
follows :
(1) Essences (Jawhar) are inseparable from accidents
(2) Accidents (%rd) are created.
(3) Anything connected with creation is itself created 
(hudutli),
The first premise, according to Averroes, is correct when 
applied to ordinary bodies, but when used with reference to the 
atom (al-juz' al-ladlii la yanqasim), various questions arise. For 
example, the existence of the atom is not Imown per se, and philo­
sophers are not agreed as to its nature.The second premise, 
Averroes said, is doubtful and questionable since we observe that 
some bodies are created, and likewise with some accidents. For 
example, time is one of tlie accidents, but it is difficult to form 
a concept of its being created.The third premise, in Averroes' 
view, is equivocal, because it could be understood in two ways; 
firstly, that which is not independent of the category of created
things, secondly, that which is not independent of this particular 
152created thing. According to Averroes' view, all three premises 
proceed to infinity. This is impossible. This is the reason why 
Averroes denied the concept of possible and necessary beings as a 
valid proof of the existence of God.
When we refer to Aquinas' discussion of possible and neces­
sary beings in the third way, we find that he did not deal with
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tliem as the Ash^arited did. He wished simply to show that there is 
in the world necessary beings and possible beings and that, the exis­
tence of tlie latter depends on the former. He also says that we can 
be sure a being is possible when we see that it is generated and
153corrupted. The sign of possible being is temporal and finitude.
So Averroes accepted the concept of necessary being which was latter
developed by Aquinas. For example, when Aquinas said there are many
necessary things in existence, Averroes stated that a thing may have
a cause and still be necessary.This means that there is not
merely one necessary being, but many. However, a difficulty still
exists in this concept and many criticism have been raised by many
writers. For example, one question that has arisen is, how do we
know that the universe is not mere unintelligible brute fact. The
argument still depends on a view of casuality that can be and has 
155been questioned.
Wliat is clear for us in Aquinas' first, second and third 
ways is their similarity,adn parallel structure. The first way 
argues from the fact of motion or change to a Prime Mover; the 
second from causation to a First Cause; the third from contingent 
beings to a Necessary Being; Each of these three argiunents estab­
lishes its case by denying the possibility of an infinite regress,
but, however similar, they are not identical, because their points
of departure are different elements.
iv. The fourth way: Argument of degrees of being
This argument is based on the gradation observed in things.
It runs as follows :
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"Some things are found to be more good, more true, more noble, and so on, and the other things less. But such 
comparative terms describe varying degrees of approximation to a superlative, for example, things are hotter and hotter 
the nearer they approach what is hottest. Something, there­fore, is the truest and best and must be noble of things, and. hence the most fully is being; for Aristotle says that 
the truest things are tlie things most fully in being. There is something therefore which causes in all other things their being, their goodness, and whatever other perfection they have. And this we call God." 157
This argument is also called the Henological argument, 
which is based on the fact that a gradation is found among things.
Some tilings are better than others, some truer, and so on. Every 
good thing is the result of what is best, insofar as what is best 
provides the basis for assessing the goodness of everything else.
From degrees of things Aquinas argued that there are not only the 
different grades of perfection in beings but also all imperfect 
beings are caused by the supreme good.
In establishing this proof Aquinas cited Aristotle's
metaphysics in Book II and Book IV which states that things possessing
the supreme degree of truth possesses also the supreme degree of being,
159This proof is also said to come closest to Platonism which was 
developed by St. Augustine and St. Anselm. From Aquinas' text we 
find that this proof is related to the theoiy of casualty, where the 
example given shows that the noblest being, the being which is abso­
lutely perfect, is the cause of all other beings which are imper­
fect.
Aquinas did not explain in detail this argument in either 
Tlie Summa Theologiae or The Summa Contra Gentiles. The basic proof 
is the doctrine of participation and exemplification. Aquinas
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argued that tlie different kinds of finite things possess different 
perfection in diverse limited degrees, and all limited degree of 
goodness are caused by the supreme good.
Some questions arise regarding this proof. For example,
does this argument prove the existence of God, of an absolute good
or only a relative one.^^^ Perhaps for this reason, the proof from 
degrees of being, is the most difficult for the modern mind to 
grasp.There are many controversiesand many difficulties^^^ 
in this proof. So there are varieties of critique of this proof.
V. The fifth way: Argimient of final cause.
This argimient is based on the guidance of nature
"Ai orderedness of actions to an end is observed in all 
bodies obeying natural laws, even when they lack awareness. For their behaviour hardly ever varies, and will practically 
always tiun out well; which shows that they truly tend to a 
goal, and do not merely hit by accident. Nothing however 
that lacks awareness except under the direction of someone with awareness and with understanding; the arrow, for example, requires on archer. Everything in nature, there­fore, is created to its goal by someone with understanding, and this we call God," 165
This proof is also called the Teleological argument or 
argument from d e s i g n . I t  is based on the purposefulness which 
we can observe in the world and moves to existence of an intelli­
gent being from whom all other beings have received their end 
purpose.
In Summa Contra GentilesAquinas clearly mentioned that 
this proof was refered to Damascene and Averroes. Aquinas argued 
that we see inorganic objects operating for an end, and this can-
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not proceed from diance, but must be the result of intention. This 
proof is derived from the idea of providence which governs-the 
universe, by which he meant, God. In fact, the idea of God giving 
orders to the universe is the common property of Christian theology.
So the proof is more familiar to theologians than philosophers, because 
the Bible is the authoritative source for theologians and they, of 
course, know that the creation of the universe is described in the 
Bible.
The proof from design is nearly the same as the proof of 
efficient cause where botli refer to the ultimate being who causes 
all movements of all beings and conducts the world; however, their 
target point is different. To the former it focuses on the harmo­
niousness of all activities of natural bodies in the universe, and 
to the latter on the cause of activities of all things, either 
intelligent or non-intelligent. Thus the scope of the latter is 
wider than the former. Aquinas also did not discuss at length this 
proof. IVhat is clear for this proof is that it is not based on 
philosophical argument as the first three of his Five Ways.
Each of Aquinas' proof of Good's existence starts from an 
obvious and indisputable fact of human experience. Tlie examination 
and understanding of the facts leads by different paths to the 
conclusion that a certain kind of being exists, whom men call God. 
Arguments employed by Aquinas are a posteriori, because they attempt 
to demonstrate the existence of God by reasoning from the effect of 
which God is the cause, and, of course, it is evident that every 
effect exists later than cause.
Aquinas' proofs were not new.^^ ^ They were taken from his 
170predecessors, Aristotle and Muslim philosophers. Howqver, the 
five ways are still regarded as Aquinas' proof, because he did not 
merely take tliem from his predecessors, but he also analysed them 
in a new and more systematic way than his predecessors. He described 
the five ways in order they do not contradict Christian teaching.
When we refer to Averroes' two arguments, there is a probablity that 
tliey were original with him, that is to say tliey were not adopted 
from any Muslim theologians. This is suggested by the fact that he 
criticized any type of proof given by either the Mu tazilite, the 
Hashawites, the Ash arites and the Sufis.
IVlien we examine closely Aquinas ' Five Ways, we shall find
they are not five separate arguments for theism, but five aspects
171or form of a single argument. There are various critiques among
modem writers who claim, for example, that Aquinas' proof of the
172existence of God fail to convince contemporary thinkers, Aquinas
173proofs are puzzling, and so on. It would not be fair to blame 
Aquinas for all the weaknesses in his arguments for God's existence, 
even if it is probably safe to say that nobody at this time had 
such a profound understanding-His high intellectual capacity to 
analyse and modify the proof of the existence of God taken from 
various sources is indisputable. We also should realize that his 
analysation to solve tlie problem of God's existence was based on 
intellectual development in the Middle Ages not in the twentieth 
century.
On analysing Aquinas' five proofs of the existence of God,
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we find that only one of them has some similarity with Averroes' 
proof and that is Aquinas ' fiftli proof and Averroes ' argument of 
providence. Both proofs are called argument from design. Averroes' 
scope of discussion is wider than Aquinas'. Averroes explained his 
proof at length, while Aquinas described his proof briefly.In fact the 
proof of Aquinas' fifth way is found in Averroes' second principle 
of the proof of providence, where Averroes and Aquinas are in agree­
ment that the existence of all things are under the control of an 
intelleigence and they do not happen by chajice. However, their 
focus is different. Averroes was concerned with the harmony which 
exists in the activity of natural bodies, and the harmoniousness of 
their activities is beneficial for huiïian life. Aquinas simply con­
centrated on the goal or end of the activities of natural bodies 
which are guided and directed by some intelligence.
In comparing the arguments for the existence of God given 
by Averroes and Aquinas, it is clear to us that Aquinas' argument, 
though they depend on the facts of experience and the observable 
world, rely ujx)ii philosophical analyses sudi as appear in The Sunmia 
Contra Gentiles. Consequently, deep intellectual capacity is needed 
to comprehend them, and so his proofs, perhaps, are not so easy to 
iDiderstand. Tlie difficulty with Aquinas ' proofs can be seen in his 
first three, which are well-known forms of the cosmological argument. 
Aquinas elaborated his proof at length in The Summa Contra Gentiles 
by employing many philosopliical assiimiitions, but on the contrary, in 
llie Summa Theologiae, he "begins from the seminal idea of God given 
in Christian revelation, and then draw from this contemplation of God 
implication for the w o r l d . T h i s  does not mean, however, that
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there are no philosophical elements in Ihe Summa Theologiae, for
"theological judgements are sometimes passed on philosophical con- 
175ceptions". Tlie difference in approach is because The Summa Contra 
Gentiles was intended to be primarily a philosophical work, and was 
written to refute the teaching of the Muslim philosophers Avicenna 
and Averroes and, hence, he naturally met them on their own 
Aristotelian ground; while Tlie Summa Theologiae is primarily theo­
logical, and is aimed at the ordinar)^  believer.
Averroes' proof of providence and creation were also based 
on observable facts which exist in the world. Averroes tried to 
avoid using any philosophical conceptions in his proof, he refered 
directly to the Quran. This is because he firmly believed that 
Quranic proof is more suitable for all levels of human intellect 
whether they are learned or belong to the laity. For this he did 
not hesitate to reject all proofs especially those given by the 
Ash^arites who based their reasoning on mæiy philosophical premises.
For Aquinas the proof of the existence of God is not only 
limited to his five proofs, but also he recognized that any proof 
given by other thinlcers is valid only if it can be understood in 
the framework that starts with accidently possessed existence and 
reasons to subsistent existence. Arguments tliat cannot be read in 
that way were not looked upon as valid. ’
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CHAPTER THREE
GOD'S KNOIVLEDGB
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A. GOD IS INTELLIGENT
In tlie preceding chapter we have seen how Averroes laid 
down briefly the attributes of God especially those which are men­
tioned in the Quran. He said firmly tliat God has knowledge because 
it is one of God's attributes of perfection, and he also stated
that life and knowledge are the most proper of God's qualities,^
2and the condition of knowledge is life. God's essence is eternal, 
and as we have seen, there is no difference, according to Averroes, 
between the essence and tlie attributes of God. Thus he said clearly 
that God's Imowledge is eternal.'
Averroes gave two reasons in support of the view that God 
has knowledge. First, the attributes of knowledge are mentioned 
in many verses of the Quran. For example, "With Him are the keys 
of the unseen, none knows them but He. He knows what is in the 
land and in the sea, not a leaf falls but He knows it. Not a grain 
in the eartli's shadows, hot a thing fresh or withered, but it is in 
a Book Manisfest,"^ and the like. Secondly, Averroes based his 
view on tlie observable facts in the world. These observable facts 
are comprehended from a verses of the Quran, that is, "Shall He not 
know, who created? And He is the All-Subtle, the All-Aware."^ 
Averroes tried to analyse this verse by relating it to our 
experience in observing the universe, and used it as proof that 
God has knowledge. He said created things, which we could see 
from arrangement and co-ordination which exist in all their parts, 
show tliat they do not occur by nature or accidentally, but there 
is one who arranges them, and one who arranges all those things
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must be intelligent.^ Accordingly, God as the director of all 
things must have knowledge, and His knowledge must be in tlie most 
perfect as His essence is. It is evident for us because how can 
one make something in accordance witli perfect laws if he has no 
knowledge of it. This is clearly impossible. Averroes gave one 
example of this. hTien a man looks at a house, he perceives that 
the foundations have been made for the walls, and the walls have 
been raised for the roof. So it becomes clear to him that the houseymust have been built by one knowing the art of building.
Though Averroes' second reason is based on observation of 
practical life, it is not merely a product of his own thought, his 
reason is still a result of his analysis of Quranic verse. Accord­
ingly, he believedthat his reasons can be understood and acceptable 
by intellectuals and the masses.
Aquinas is in full agreement with Averroes on the proposi­
tion that God has knowledge.^ Like Averroes, he also refered to some 
verses of Biblical scripture in affirming that God has knowledge.
For example, "He is wise of heart and might in strength.""^
In addition to the scripture, Aquinas gave many other rea­
sons to prove that God has loiowledge. One of those reasons is 
that he regarded God as the First Mover^^ as we have seen in his 
proof of the existence of God. He said there are many moversin 
the world which are endowed with intelligence, and they as instru­
ments are dependent on the First Mover. If the second mover has 
knowledge, tlien it is impossible that God as the First Mover should 
move without intellect. Therefore, God must be intelligent.
1 0 6
Aquinas also argued from the point of view of perfection.
Among the greatest perfection of things is that something be
intelligent, and all the perfection of creatures, as he has proved
12them, are foLind in God. Therefore, God is intelligent^  Furtlier-
more, he said that natural bodies tend toward an end not by chance
as he proved in his fifth proof of the existence of God. They are
dorected by one wlio has understanding to direct something to attain
13an end, and the director of all natural bodies is God. Therefore 
God has knowledge. From this point of view it is similar to that 
of Averroes in which he analysed a verse of the Quran.
It is clear for us that there is no controversy between 
Averroes and Aquinas in their account of God’s knowledge. The 
content of their proofs is the same where both refered to verse of 
each one’s scripture, but what is different is their manner of 
expression. Avveroes’ observation on the harmoniousness of the 
universe is based on tlie Quranic text, Aquinas’ argument is based 
on a philosophical point of view. Aquinas, however, also refered 
to scripture as an authoritative source in faith. This is because 
Aquinas himself emphasized that certain truths about God surpasses 
human reason, and so it should be helped by revelation.As we 
have seen Aquinas’ main task in writing the Summa Contra Gentile 
was to oppose individual errors made during his time, when the 
development of the intellect in Paris had reached a peak. There­
fore, Aquinas prefered reason to scripture in his proof relating 
to God. This is very clear from his statement:
"Thus, against the Jews we are able to argue by means of 
the Old Testment, while against heretics we are able to
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argue by means of the New Testment. But the Muliammadan 
find the pagans accept neither the one nor the other. We 
must, therefore, have recourse to the natural reason, to 
which all men are forced to give their assent. However, 
it is true, in divine matter the natural reason has its 
failing." 15
- 108
B. THE NATURE OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE•
The nature of God's Imowledge has been widely discussed and 
it was given serious attention by Muslim philosophers. The views 
were sufficiently diverse, that Al-Ghazali had accused some of these 
views of heresy.Our discussion of this matter, however, is 
limited to a certain area that both Averroes and Aquinas discussed.
i, God's knowledge of contingent events-
Averroes devoted much space in his Taliafut al-Tahafut and
Tafsir Ma Ba^d al-Tabi^at to discuss the problem of whether God
knows or does not know other things tlian himself. He did not ,
hesitate to support the idea of the philosophers who say God does
17not know other things than Himself. For this support Averroes
gave some reasons. One is based on the perfection of the divine
essence. If God were to know objects other than Himself, this would
mean that the divine essence, according to Averroes, was not itself
an act of thinking, but that it was in potency to the performance
of this act, while, as we have seen, there is no potency in God.
Furthermore, if God understands other things outside of Himself it
necessarily would be that His essence is changeable to something
inferior or less perfect.This, however, is not possible, for
divine intellect necessarily possesses the highest degree of excel-
19lence and perfection. Again since knowledge of something other 
than oneself supposes a transition from potency to act, God's imow­
ledge of anything other than Himself would imply not only movement 
in God but also a mover other than Himself, for every movement 
presupposes a mover. This, however, is repugnant, as God is the
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20Unmoved kfover. These reasons given by Averroes show us that God
knows nothing except His own essence. This problem creates a
dilemma in our mind. According to Averroes if it is assumed that
God thinks of something outside of His essence this would imply that
He is perfected by something else, but to assume that God does not
think of something outside of His essence would imply that He is
ignorant of existences in the universe. To solve this dilemma
Averroes described carefully the meaning of the proposition "the
First Principle (God) does not know other things than Himself." He
said that God, by taiowing Himself, knows the nature of all things
as existence, and in this way He knows all, because His knowledge
21is the cause of all beings. For example, one who knows only the
heat of fire is not said to be ignorant of the nature of heat in
other hot objects, because he Icnows the nature of heat inasmuch as
it is heat; so in tlie same way the First Being knows the nature of
22an existent by that simple existent which is Himself. Moreover,
Averroes explained the meaning of this proposition by the fact that
God does not think of existents in the way in which thinking exis-
tents can think of them, for if they thinlc as God thinks it would
23participate in God’s knowledge.
From the explanation given by Averroes above about the
proposition, "God does not know other things than Himself," it does
not follow from this tliat He is ignorant of them since for God,
Imowing only His essence is sufficient for Him to loiow other things.
Ihis is because all forms and all order and all arrangement which
are potentially present in prime matter exist actually in the First
24Mover, in a manner like artifacts in the mind of an artisan. In
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other words, God, as the cause of existence of all things, contains 
in Himself as exemplar all that He brings into existence in actuali­
zing tlie potentialities of matter: and God also as Bxampler contains
all in Himself in an eminent way. God essence, according to philo­
sopher, contains all intellect, all existence, in a nobler and more
25perfect way than they all possess in reality. This is what Averroes 
meant by the proposition that God does not know other things that Him­
self.
Aquinas apparently departed from Averroes in this cases.
He clearly stated that God also loiows, in addition to knowing him­
self, things other than Himself,His statement is supported by
Dionysius who said "Tlie divine wisdom, knowing itself, loiows other 
27things. To make his proof stronger, Aquinas refers to Biblical
scripture "And before Him no creature is hidden, but all are open
28and laid bare to tlie eyes of Him with whom we have to do." Aquinas
gave some reasons why God knows things other than Himself. He said
God's power extends to other things by being the first cause which
produces all beings. The power of a thing cannot be known perfectly
unless the objects to which the power extends are knowi. Thus God
29must know things other than Himself. Another reason is God as the 
first cause is His act of loiowing. Whatever effects pre-exist in 
God must be in His knowledge in an intelligible way. Therefore, God 
loiows things other than Himself.
Aquinas expounded two ways by which God understands tilings 
30other than Himself. First, by itself, and secondly, by another. 
In the former way, God loiows Himself as a perfect being through His
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essence, and in the latter way God knows things other than Himself.
In this way God Imows other things through the likeness of what
they contain, because God’s essence contains their likeness. Hence
Aquinas concluded that God knows other things than Himself not in
31themselves but in Himself,
What is clear for us in Averroes' and Aquinas' discussions 
in til is case is the difference in their arguments; the former is 
negative and tlie latter is positive. Averroes' argument apparently 
denies that God knows things other than Himself, but in reality 
(haqiqat) that is not the case. When we look at the reason given 
by both we find they refer to the essence of God. This, as we have 
seen, is clear witli Averroes and as well as with Aquinas. If 
Averroes said that God by knowing His essence knows also other 
things, then Aquinas follows in the same way. For Aquinas, the way 
God knows other things is also by knowing His own essence. This 
means by knowing Himself He knows other things. His argument is 
clear when he commented on Augustine who said "that God does not 
behold anything external to Him", that is "not to be understood as 
meaning that He does not behold anything that is external to Him­
self, but as meaning that what is external to Himself He beholds 
32only in Himself." On this matter probably both are correct.
Aquinas, in fact, recognized clearly that God primarily
33and essentially Icnows only Himself. His argument is if God under­
stands something other tlian Himself as the primary and essential 
object of His understanding His intellect must change from a con­
sideration of Himself to the consideration of something else. This
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something else is less noble than God. Thus the divine intellect 
is changed for the worse, which is impossible. This statement by 
Aquinas is the same as that of Averroes who said that God does not 
know other things than Himself. But Aquinas stressed the distinc­
tion between the primar>^  and essential. In other words that God 
knows things other than Himself is not primary and essential to Him.
If He knows them as He loiows Himself, His intellect is changable to 
the lower things. This reason is the same as given by Averroes.
Mien God knows things outside of Himself, the question 
arises whether His knowledge is increased or not through the plurality 
of His object loiown. Averroes replied that it is possible according 
to philosophers that there should exist plurality in God's leiow- 
ledge.They, however, deny the plurality by which He knows things 
through a knowledge which is additional to His essence. A confusion 
occurs again in our mind, Averroes said, because we relate this 
problem to human knowledge. In fact there is no plurality of things 
known in God's knowledge like their numerical plurality in human 
knowledge. Thus we must deny all foms of plurality which exists 
in our mind of God's knowledge; just as any change through change 
of objects known must be denied to Him.^^
From Averroes' account of this matter, it seems to us that 
he did not deny absolutely that there is plurality in God's know­
ledge. He recognized a plurality in (k>d's knowledge but we as 
hunan beings cannot know the form of plurality that exists in God's
knowledge. And he, of course, confiimied that God's knowledge can-
37not be understood by analogy to human knowledge.
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In this matter Aquinas departed from Averroes. For Aquinas,
the multitude of intellectual objects cannot be taken to mean that
38they have a distinct being in God. God does not have knowledge
of multitude by the fact that many intelligibles are found outside 
39Him, This means that His knowledge is not increased through many 
intelligible objects known, because His laiowHedge is not derived 
from physical objects, rather it is the cause of them.
Aquinas gave many reasons for refuting Averroes’ view.
Aquinas said the divine intellect understands all things by His 
own essence.Nevertheless the divine essence is the likeness of 
all things,Thereby it follow that the conception of the divine 
intellect as understanding itself is the likeness not only of God 
Himself understood, but also of all those things of which the devine 
essence is the likeness. In this way, through one intelligible 
species which is the divine essence, and through one understood
intention, whidi is the devine word, God can understaiid many things.
42Again, Aquinas argued that God understands all things together, 
for He understands a continuous whole all at once, not part after 
part. So, too. He understands propositions all at once, not first 
tire subject and tlren the predicate. For every intellect that 
understands one thing after the other is inevitably involved with 
potenc)^ , while there is no potency in God. From this Aquinas 
concluded that whenever several things are larown tirrough one species, 
they can be known together. God, therefore, knows them together. 
Furthermore, Aquinas said, if God has knowledge of multitude by 
knowing many things, this means His lorowledge is accumulative, but 
His knowledge is not discursive.He does not consider one thing
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after the other as it were a succession, but all together. More­
over, there is no composition and division in the divine intellect. 
If, then, God considers tilings by means of composing and dividing, 
it will follow that His understanding is not solely one but many, 
and thus His essence, as well, will not be solely one. Since His 
intellectual operation is His essence.To support this view 
Aquinas quoted Dionysius' statement, "Therefore in blowing itself,
the devine wisdom knows all things - the material immaterially, the
45visible invisibly, and the many unitedly."
When we analyse Aquinas' denial of plurality in God's Imow- 
ledge he based his argument on the proposition that God knows all 
tilings by knowing His own essence. Since His essence is one and 
simple, and since His essence is the cause of all things, then by 
blowing His essence alone He biows all things at once. By this 
way til ere is no plurality in God's knowledge though there are many 
intelligible objects biown by Him.
In consequence of this discussion we are led to another 
crucial point, that is, whether God Imows future contingent events 
or not, Averroes did not state explicit/ that God loiows other 
things than Himself as Aquinas did, but he intrinsically recognised 
that God knows them as has been discussed. Averroes' focus here, 
however, is not on the question of whether God knows or does not 
know future event, but on the relationship between God's knowledge 
and events whose existence involves time and space, act and potency.
Tlie question is how can God be aware of a change in reality 
without a corresponding change occuring in His eternal loiowledge?
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If all beings were in God’s knowledge before tliey exist, are they 
in their state of existence the same in His knowledge as they were 
before their existence, or are they in their state of existence, 
different in His knowledge than they were before they existed? 
Averroes made two assumptions before answering this question. First, 
if we say that God's Icnowledge about things at the time they exist 
is different before they existed, it follows that God's loiowledge 
is subject to change, and thus there is an additional knowledge 
(‘ilm za'id} to God's knowledge, but this is not possible for eternal 
knowledge ( *^ilm al-qadim).^  ^ Secondly, if we say that God's know­
ledge of them in both states is one and the sajne, are they in them­
selves, tlie beings which come to existence, the same before they 
existed as when they existed? The answer to this question, accord­
ing to Averroes, is no. In themselves tliey are not the same before 
they existed as wlien they existed, otherwise the existent and non­
existent is one.^^
To solve this problem, according to Averroes, we should 
recognize and distinguish that the position of God's knowledge 
with respect to beings, which will be discussed later, is different 
from the position of originated knowledge (al-llm al-muhdath) with 
respect to beings, God's knowledge is the cause of being, while 
the existence of beings is the cause of our knowledge. The 
confusion arises from the mistake of speaking of an analogy between 
the eternal knowledge and originated knowledge. Tliis analogy, 
according to Averroes, is false.Again, Averroes said we do not 
have to admit that if there occurs no change in God's knowledge He 
does not know beings at the time they come to existence just as
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they are. However have to admit that He knows them with eternal 
knowledge, for the occurrence of change in knowledge when beings 
change is a condition only in originated Icnowledge not in God's 
knowledge.
When we recognize that God's Icnowledge is not the same as
ours, we can say, according to Averroes, that God Imows of a thing
before it exists that it will come into existence; knows it as when
it exists ; Imows it when it has been destroyed at the time of its 
51destruction. This is the method or way of the revealed law (shar^ ) 
which is intelligible to the masses. For this reason we cannot say 
that God knows any event in this universe either by created or
52eternal knowledge, because this is an innovation (bid/at) in Islam.
Islani forbids discussion of God's Imowledge in a dialectical way.
We especially the masses, should accept what has been mentioned in
the Quran. Averroes made an example that the discussion of this
problem with the masses is like 'bringing poisons to the bodies of
animals, poisons, however, are relative, namely, what is poison for
53one animal is nourishment for another."
Turning to Aquinas, we do not find this problem of under­
standing his position in relation to the question of whether God 
Imows or does not Imow future contingent events. We can even say 
that God Imows them because Aquinas has already mentioned that God 
knows things other than Himself, and these things are contingents.
For this, however, he still made a clear statement that God knows
future events.How does He know future events? Aquinas' answer
55is that God knows them together, . though contingent events come 
into existence successively, because His knowledge is measured by
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eternity, and since His knowledge is His own essence, He under­
stands Himself completely. Thus His knowledge, as a source of 
all beings, comprehends them together. This was a controversial 
point with Averroes*, because for Averroes if God knows all things 
at once, as we have seen before, this means that God's knowledge 
about past, present and future events is the same. This is, • 
according to Averroes, impossible, for knowledge is said to be 
dependent on the existent thing. When as existent things some­
times exists in act and sometimes in potential, it is necessary 
that the knowledge of the two existents to be different, because
the time of being in potency is quite different from the time of 
57being in act. But Aquinas viewed this from another point, namely,
God's act of knowing is no other than His own essence. In God, he
said, intellect and that whidi is Icnown and that knowledge of
species, and the act of knowing are entirely one and the same.^ ^
though contingent events are changeable, and in this are involved
potency and act, time and space, God's knowledge of them is un-
59changed, rather they change in themselves. Aquinas' statement 
is quite clear about this.
"There is no change in the divine knowledge through His knowing that one and the same thing at one time exists 
and at another time does not; and in the way there is 
no change in the divine knowledge through His knowing that a certain proposition is at one time true, and at 
another time false." 60
Averroes' discussion of this matter appears to us as though 
he compared God’s knowledge with human knowledge. Of course, if 
werefer to his treatment in relation to human Icnowledge, it is 
correct, but as we have seen, he clearly mentioned that God's
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knowledge and human knowledge are totally different, and His Icnow­
ledge and other attributes are incomparable with the attributes of 
creatures.
Averroes' reason for why it is impossible that God knows 
all things together is because the existence of an event in a state 
or potency is different from its existence in a state of actuality. 
IVIien the existence of events is different in both states, then the 
Icnowledge of a Icnown event also must be different. This cannot be 
applied to God. Here again, it seems to us that Averroes's discus­
sion is brought within the context of human knowledge, while he 
himself confirmed that there is no comparison between God's know­
ledge and human knowledge.
Ihe controversy between Averroes and Aquinas on this matter 
arises because of different emphisis. Averroes' view stressed the 
aspect of creation which viewed in terms of the existence of crea­
tion involves the problem of temporal change, that is, before or 
after. As for Aquinas, his view emphasized the unity of the 
essence of God. God's essence and His act of Icnowing is the same. 
Thus by knowing Himself He Icnows all things simultaneously witliout 
involving time,
ii. God's knowledge in universal and particular
In the previous discussion we have seen from Averroes' 
statement that God knows only Himself. In order to avoid the 
consequence that He is ignorant of existents, some philosopher, 
for example, Avicenna, said that God knows them universally. This 
solution, however, was rejected by Averroes. Averroes held firmly
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that God’s knowledge is neither universal nor particular,because 
if we predicate both of them to God we raise many problems which 
distort our knowledge of God, If we say on the one hand that God's 
Icnowledge is universal, as suggested by Avicenna,this means God's 
Icnowledge is not completely perfect, for in tliis way He just knows 
something in a general way as very often occurs in human knowledge. 
On the other hand if we say that God's Icnowledge is particular, 
this means God's knowledge is changeable, for particular is a quan­
titative number derived from the universal, and yet we recognize 
that God transcends passivity and change.
Averroes' denial that God's Icnowledge is either universal 
or particular is based on certain reasons. He said one whose know­
ledge is universal knows actually existing particulars only in •
65potency, while there is no potency in God's Icnowledge. Again,
knowledge in potency is less perfect tlian Icnowledge in act,^ ^ for
knowledge in potency is Icnowledge in matter. Therefore, the First
knowledge (al-Hlm al-awwal) should be a knowledge in act, and
there should be no universal at all, and no plurality which arises
out of potency, like the plurality of species which results from 
67the genus.'' God's knowledge is not particular, added Averroes, 
because particular is one infinite in number and cannot be grasped 
in their totality by knowledge. Furthermore, knowledge of indivi­
duals or particulars is derived from sensation or imagination.
This is impossible for God. For the reasons given above Averroes 
concluded that God's knowledge of existence cannot be described as 
universal or particular, for both universal and particular are
69effects of existents, and Icnowledge of both also is transitory.
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Mbreover, Averroes said that knowledge which implies the concept
of universal cind particular is passive intellect and an effect,
70whereas the First Intellect is pure act and a cause. The terms 
universal and particular, according to Averroes, are terms used in 
himian knowledge and are incompatible with God's Icnowledge.
Aquinas also refuted those who said that God's knowledge 
71is universal. He, however, argued somewhat differently from 
Averroes. God's Icnowledge is not universal; not, however, for tlie 
reason given by Averroes, that universal Icnowledge is Icnowledge of 
particular in potency, but because God's essence is as it were a 
medium by which He knows things,
Aquinas, however, departed from Averroes on the question of
God’s Icnowledge of particùlars. Aquinas plainly stated that God
has knowledge of particular things, because to Icnow something
72generally and not specifically is to Icnow it imperfectly. Again,
if God does not Icnow particular things which even men know, it would
73follow that God is the most foolish of beings. ' Aquinas gave many 
reasons to establish his argument. Among his reason are as follows: 
God is His being, so, He is His knowing. All perfections of beings 
must be found in Him as their cause. Therefore, there must be found 
in Him knowledge of perfection of all knowledge. But this would not 
be so if the knowledge of particular things were lacking to Him. 
Therefore, God must have a knowledge of singulars.Again, if God 
did not Icnow a particular thing His power would not operate on it, 
so He must Icnow particular things. Moreover, Aquinas argued that 
the distinction of a thing cannot be from chance, because it has a 
fixed order. Ihe distinction in things must, therefore, derive
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from the intention of a being which is its cause. It cannot be
form intention of a cause acting through a necessity of nature, •
for nature is determined by one cause of action. It remains then,
tliat the distinction in things comes from the intention of knowing
cause. It seems to be proper to the intellect to consider the
distinction of things. Now, the universal distinction of things
cannot be from the intention of some secondary cause, because all
sudi causes belong to the world of distinct effects. It belongs
to the First Cause to aim at the distinction of all things. There-
75fore, God must have a knowledge of particular tilings. Aquinas 
also refered to scripture as a source of authority in doctrine,
"And God saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was very 
good.
To sliow the omniscience of God, Aquinas described the
concept of God’s knowledge in a wider scope than tlie aforementioned.
God’s knowledge, he said, extends not only to tlie things that are,
whether these are universals or particulars, but also to the things
that are not, for these things that are not, nor will be, nor ever
77were, are Icnown by God as possible to His power. As an artisan
knows tlirough his art even those things that have not yet been
fashioned, since the fomis of his art flow from his knowledge of
extenial matter for the constitution of the artifacts, even so God
knows of things not yet existent. Aquinas also refered to scripture
as witness to God’s omniscience, "Before I formed you in the womb
78I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you," Further­
more, Aquinas said that God knows infinite things if there are 
infinite things, because He does not only know that which is actual,
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but also that whidi is potential, and among natural tilings tliere
79is infinity in potency. God's understanding is infinite. If, 
then, we are able to grasp finite things according to our under­
standing which is finite, so God according to His understanding can 
grasp infinite things. This agrees with a verse in the Psalm, "And 
of His wisdom there is no number.
What we have seen in the discussion of the universal and 
the particular in God's knowledge, is that Averroes explicitly said 
that God's knowledge is neither universal nor particular, and he 
gave his own reason, while Aquinas, on the one hand, agreed with 
Averroes that God's knowledge is not universal, but, on the other 
hand, he disagreed on God's knowledge of the particular, and Aquinas 
also gave many reasons for this, Averroes' proof is probably 
acceptable when we relate his discussion to human knowledge, but we 
have some difficulties in accepting his proof if his discussion as 
related to God's knowledge, because God's knowledge and human know­
ledge are different, and he himself mentioned that no one can
81imagine how God's knowledge is except He himself. Averroes also
warned us in order not to discuss at length God's Imowledge, especial-
82ly with the masses, for it is not the purpose of revealed law.
Aquinas centralised his discussion: God's act of knowing is His
essence. God Imows Himself perfectly, and His Imowledge is the 
source of all existing beings. Consequently God knows everything 
whether it is in general or in particular, whether it is existent 
or non-existent, whether it is finite or infinite, Aquinas’ proof 
was intended to show God's omniscience, especially in his discussion 
of particular things in God's knowledge.
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C. GOD’S KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
To avoid confusion in the discussion of God’s knowledge
regarding whether God knows in general or in particular, whether
He Imows or does not know other tilings than Himself, Averroes gave
this solution: God’s knowledge and ours are not uni vocal. In
other words the term knowledge which is used of God’s knowledge
does not have the same meaning as when it is used in ours. Averoes,
however, said that the term kno\Æedge used in relation to God and
83to human beings is equivocal. There is no one definition 
embracing both kinds of Imowledge.
Averroes gave some reasons for the distinction between
God’s knowledge and human Imowledge. One is that God's knowledge
84is tlie cause of the existents, while ours is tlie effect of tliem.
A consequence of this is that lumian knowledge is relative, because 
it is attained in many stages. It begins through tlie senses and 
then moves to the imagination. It moves from the general to the 
particular. All human sciences are passivities (infi^ alit) and 
impressions (ta'thirat) from existents, and existents operate on 
them. But God's knowledge operates on existents and existents 
receive the activities of God's Imowledge.Again, our knowledge 
is imperfect and subsequent to things known. This is clear from 
our daily practical life in which the knowledge we get from the 
senses brings experience which operates on existents. As for God, 
His knowledge is perfect because His act of knowing is no other 
than His own essence. His knoledge is not involved with time;^  ^
neither before nor after. Furthermore, Averroes explained that 
human intellect is knowledge of the existents in potency, not
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knowledge in act, and knowledge in potency is less perfect than 
87knowledge in act, because knowledge in potency is Imowledge in 
88matter. But God's Imowledge is always in act, for His Imoledge 
is His own essence, and His essence is pure act which means no 
potency at all.
Aquinas agreed witli Averroes that God's knowledge and human
knowledge are not univocal.In fact, not only the attribute of
/knowledge but also all other attributes of tlie creature cannot be 
predicted univocal ly with God.*^  ^ Aquinas, however, did not give 
the same argument as Averroes gave. He recognized Averroes' proposi­
tion as true, that is, that things are the cause of our knowledge 
and the divine knowledge is the cause of things,but did not make 
tliat proposition as his reason to show that God's knowledge and ours 
are not univocal. The reason given by Averroes, according to Aquinas
is insufficient because it still does not remove univocity of 
92predication. Divine knowledge, according to Aquinas is not uni­
vocal with ours, not because it is the cause of things and ours is 
caused, but because it is Imowledge which is divine,In other 
words God's Imowledge is His essence Himself which causes the exis­
tence of all beings. Accordingly, God's knowledge cannot be predi­
cated in an univocal sense with creatures' Imowledge.
Aquinas disagreed witli Averroes when Averroes said that 
tlie term knowledge is used as equivocal in God and creatures, 
because nothing can be predicated of God and creature in a purely 
equivocal way, but what can be said of the relationship between 
God and creature is in an analogical way, as has been discussed in 
the preceding chapter.
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In fact, Averroes did not say as Aquinas did that tlie term
Imowledge used of God and creatures is used in a purely equivocal
sense, but simply said in equivocal name (ishtrak al-ism). The
using of an "equivocal name" between God and creature is because
God has knowledge, and He Imows something, and man has knowledge
and he also knows something. Thus the term knowledge from this
point of view, according to Averroes, can be predicated of both
as a literal meaning, but not in reality, because it is not true,
Averroes said, that eternal knowledge is the same as temporal
Imowledge, and one who believes this makes God an eternal man, and 
94man a mortal God.
Aquinas denied the use of pure equivocation, because if
there is pure equivocation tlien there is no likeness in things
themselves. It is clear, however, from what he has said that there
95is a certain mode of likeness of things to God. On this matter,
96if we refer to Aquinas' text, what lie denied clearly is "Pure 
equivocation" and Averroes, in fact, did not say this, rather he 
just said "equivocation." Thus Averroes' proposition probably is 
not completely wTong, because he also recognized that it is impos­
sible to predicate some attributes of God and creatures purely 
and precisely in an equivocal sense, for, as has previously been 
shown, God's knowledge stands in opposition to man's - His Imow­
ledge is the cause of existents, and man's is derived from and 
cause by physical objects which affect the mind through the senses.
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A. PRELIMINARY PROBLEM
Prédistination is acrucial problem not only in Islam but 
also in Christianity. There has been a long and continuing discus­
sion by theologians on both sides. Mbreover, it is clear that there 
is no satisfaction to all thinkers. In relation to this Averroes 
said that predestination is one of the most intricate problems in 
Islam (shar* iyyat). ^
The main question in predestination in Islamic theory is 
whether man has the power to act or the free will to choose his 
action. If he has no power to act or free will, it means his 
action is caused by another power outside of his will. If he has 
the power of free will, it means God’s omnipotence is challenged. 
Averroes quoted many different Quranic verses whidi apparently show 
both that man has power to do something and that lie does not possess 
this power. In addition to Quranic verses Averroes also reffered to 
the traditions of the prophet Miliairanad and rational arguments, The 
Quranic verses which show that man has free will and acquisition 
(kasb) over his action are, for example, 'Whatever affliction may 
visit you is for what your own hands have earned,"^ "as for Thamud 
We guided them, but they preferred blindness above guidance,"^ and 
others. The Quranic verses which show that man is compelled in his 
work are, for example, "surely We have created everything in 
measure,"^ "no affliction befalls in the earth or in yourselves but 
it is in a Book, before We create itSometimes in a single verse 
we find this controversy. For example, "l^ iatever good visits thee, 
it is of God (Allall), and whatever evil visits thee is of your­
self."^  l\vo traditions of the prophet Muhammad refered to by
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Averroes are first, "Every child is born according to nature (fitrah)
and his parents make him a Jew or a Christian," and second,"These
were created for paradise and will do the work for the people of
paradise; and these were created for hell and they do work for the 
8people of hell." The first tradition shows that the cause of 
disbelief (kufr) is one's oim environment, and the second points 
out that the wickedness and disbelief are both caused by God and 
that man is compelled to follow them.^
The controversy controversy concerning the rational proof 
arises from, according to Averroes, if, on the one hand, we say 
that man is the creator of his own action it would be necessary to 
admit that there are things which are not done according to the will 
of God. So there would be another creator beside God, while all 
Muslims agreed that there is no creator but Allah, If, on the other 
hand, we were to suppose that man cannot act freely, we admit that he 
is compelled to do certain acts, and when a man is under compulsion 
in his acts, then moral obligation (taklif) belongs to the category 
of imposition beyond capacity to bear (ma la yutaq). And if a man 
has duty laid on him beyond his capacity, there is no difference 
between his work and the work of inoganic matter.
For the phenomena mentioned above, Muslims, according to 
Averroes, are divided into two major g r o u p s t h e  Mu'^ tazilites 
who held that man's aquisition is the cause of wickedness and 
goodness. Thus they are responsible for their acts, and consequently 
they cannot blame God if they will be punished. Mother group was 
called the Jabarites who held that man is under compulsion in his
134 -
acts. In other words the Mu^tazilites are called libertarians^ ^
13and Jabarites prédistinarians. In addition to these groups there 
is another group called the Ash‘arites. Their view on predestina­
tion, according to Averroes, lies between the two extreme views - 
the Mu‘*tazilites and the Jabarites. They say that man has acquisi­
tion, but the deed done (al-mul<tasab) and the power of doing (kasb) 
it are both created by God.^  ^ Averroes, in his efforts to harmonize 
the doctrine of revelation (Quran) and philosophy, criticized tlie 
view of the three groups and gave his own solution which will be 
discussed below.
In Christianity, as in Islam, there is also a controversy
about the concept of predestination. Some verses of Biblical
scripture mention that man is predestined by God. For example,
'%o can produce someone clean out of someone unclean? There is 
ISnot one," " and, "those whom He fore-ordained He also called; and
those whom He called He also justified; and those whom He justified
He also glorified,Besides, there are some verses which point
out that man is not subject to the predestination of God. For
example, "They shall go after the Lord, He will roar like a lion,
17yea. He will roar," and, "so that they may indeed see but not 
perceive, and may indeed hear but not imderstand; least they should 
turn again, and be forgiven."^ ^ These verses, however, may be 
differently interpreted,^  ^just as the Quranic verses in relation 
to predestination are interpreted differently by different sects.
The controversy over predestination in Christianity can 
be seen also in the development of theological doctrine during the
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mediaeval times. It was regarded as the most animated controversy
20of the ninth century. St. Augustine, a great theologian, in the
ancient world, and the most influential Christian Neoplatonist had
a great influence upon the history of dogma and upon religious
thought in western Christendom. His teaching dominated Christian
thought until the rise of Aristotelianism in the early part of the
21thirteenth century.^ His doctrine of predestination was influential, 
though not always accepted, in subsequent Christian thought as an 
authoritative source during his time and onward.
Ibe general conception of predestination held by Augustine
is that man has free will and repsonsibility, in the sense that his
acts are his own personal deeds, expressing his own nature in its
22response to the various situations in which he finds himself.
Augustine's scope of predestination was, "that all things before
they happen, and that, which we do by our free will, everything that
we feel and know would not happen without our volition,""  ^some
aspects of Augustine's doctrine of predestination, however, were
opposed by some theologians such as Gottschalk (b.805) who held
that no one is able to use free will to do good, but only to do 
24evil. A controversy also occurred between Gottschalk and Hincmar
(d.882), and between Hincmar and Gregory TV (d,844). We also find
disputation about predestination between the Augustinians who held
that we ought to believe both the grace of God and the free will of 
25man, and the Pelagians who hold a theoiy of free choice of will
which leaves little place for the grace of God.^  ^ In consequence
27of the controversy about predestination some conferences were 
held to solve it. For example, at the coimcil of Mayence in 848,
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Gottsdialk's doctrine of predestination was condemned, and at the 
council of Toucy in 860 there was an effort to harmonize-Gregory's 
view and Hincmar's. The controversy, however, went on without any 
final decision having been reached. The struggle between the 
doctrine of Augustine and that of the semipelagians continued for 
a long time,
Tliough there were many theologians who opposed Augustine's
doctrine, he was, in fact, recognized witliout doubt as the most
28authentic doctor among all the expositors of sacred scripture. 
Aquinas, who was more Aristotelian than Platonist, did not reject 
Augustine's doctrine, but rather he carried out his criticism of 
Augustine and appealed to the Biblical scripture and proceeded to 
re-establish the truth by rescuing Augustine's doctrine as one 
of the authoritative sources in the formation of Christian thought.
It is worth noticing here that the dispute over predestina­
tion in Christianity was not the same as in Islam. In Christianity 
theologians did not dispute the verses of scripture, rather their 
disagreement concerned the proper concept of predestination, while 
in Islam theologians disagreed about the proper sense of the 
Quranic texts for this was tlie key to the proper interpretation 
of the concept of predestination.
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B. GOD’S ATTRIBUTES IN RELATION TO PREDESTINATION
To understand the concept of the predestination of God we 
should discuss three of His attributes; the will, the power and the 
justic of God, and their relation to human free will. The discussion 
of these three attributes, however, does not cover all aspects, being 
more concerned with the relation of human power and free will to God’s 
power and will.
i. Hie will and the power of God
Averroes affirmed that God has will and power since they are
two of tlie attributes of God’s perfection mentioned in the Quran.
There are many verses which show this. For example, ’’God, performer
of what He desires,and, ’’Truly God is powerful over everything,
and the like. In addition to the Quranic proof, Averroes provided a
rational argument (dalil a^qliyl for them. We recognize that God
has knowledge, as discussed before, consequently God must have power
and will.Moreover, Averroes said, God knows opposites, and when
only one of the opposites proceeds from Him, it shows that there is
another attribute besides loiowledge, namely, will, and it is in this
way that the affirmation of will in the first must be understood
32according to philosophers. Again, since it is established that the
world exist through the First Agent who peferred its existence to its
non-existence, accordingly,it is necessary tliat this agent should be 
- 33a wilier (murid). Similarly, Averroes said that God has power 
because He is Pure Act and Real Agent, who brings potency into act,^  ^
Furthermore, God is, as an agent of all causes, drawing forth the 
universe from a state of non-existence to existence and conserving
138
it; and such an act is a more perfect and glorious one than any 
perfonmed by empirical agents (fa/ilat al-musha]iadat) • .Tliis 
means that all existants are created by God who has absolute power.
In many circrmistances Averroes defended the ideas of the 
philosophers in relation to the will and power of God. Mien philo­
sophers say that God has no w i l l i t  does not mean they deny
absolutely the will of God, but they say that He does not will in
37the way that man wills. Thus the will of God as understood by
philosophers is nothing more than the claim tliat every act proceeds
from Him through knowledge, together with which He also knows 
38opposites. Averroes, who agreed with this idea of the philoso­
phers, explained the difference between God’s will and human will.
In tlie human will, Averroes said, one whose will has reached its
39object, no longer wills, while the eternal (God’s) will does not
cease through the presence of tlie object willed.Furthermore,
one who will lacks the things which he wills, while God does not
lack anything He wills.Averroes also said that will is a desire
of the agent towards action, which rouses movement to perfect its
42essence. Desire and movement are only found in an animate body. 
Again, the empirical will is a faculty which possesses the possibi­
lity of doing equally one of two contrariesSo the will in this 
manner is passive and changing^^  as shown in the discussion of the 
existence of God. Averroes concluded that all these kinds of will 
belong to lumian beings and cannot be attributed to God, because the 
kind of will in human beings is imperfect, while God is absolutely 
perfect and transcendent. Averroes, however, stated that the will 
of God, as well as His knowledge, is spoken of in an equivocal
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45name, that is, will in human beings is, as mentioned before, a 
faculty to choose one of two possibilities, and God’s will, also 
differentiates one of two contraries. For example, God chooses 
existence, not non-existence. So in tliis case the will of God and 
ours is said to be spoken of in an equivocal name. The concept and 
scope of these t\sro wills are different. We cannot explain suffi­
ciently, Averroes said, the will of God, as we do our own, because 
the manner of His will is inconceivable,^ ^ and that because there 
is no counterpart to His will in the empirical world (al-shihid). 
Based on Averroes’ reasoning mentioned above, we cannot say that 
God is acting intentionally by created or eternal will^^ in His 
creation, and to say that He intended to create a thing by eternal 
intention (iradat qadimat) is an innovation in Islam, which is not 
rationally apprehended by the learned,
Likewise, Averroes distinguished the power of God and human
power. First he divided agents into two kinds; natural agents
(fa^ il hi al-tal/ ) and voluntary agents (faMl hi al-ikhtiyar)^^
51Natural agents, according to Averroes, act without knowledge, and
52its act is constant (da’imj. It also performs actions of only
53one kind, for example, warmth causes heat and coldness causes cold. 
Volun.tar>^  agents act differently from natural agents. Voluntary 
agents act through Icnowledge and deliberation and perform certain 
action at one time and its opposite at another.God as First 
Agent and Pure Act is different from those two kinds of agent. In 
other words, God acts neither by nature nor election, because if 
He acts by nature it means all existents are the same kind as noted 
above. This is impossible by our experience. He also does not act
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by election (iklitiyar) because one who cooses, chooses for himself
the better condition of two things, but God is not in need of a 
55better condition. Averroes agreed with the idea of philosophers 
who said that all existents proceed from God in a way superior to 
nature and to liimian will, for both these ways are subject to an 
imperfection.^ ^ Mien Averroes said that God does not act by elec­
tion, this does not mean He is forced by another power in His 
action, but it means He does not act by will and election as human 
will and election. In fact, Averroes mentioned that God performs 
one of the two contraries (mutaqabilayn) through choice, but the 
manner of choice is not Imoim by us, Averroes stated tlie scope of 
the power of God, ''that &)d never ceases to have power for action, 
and that it is impossible that anytiling should prevent His act ... 
we cannot say that He should have no power at one time but power 
at another, and that He could be called powerful only at definite 
limited times.
Aquinas, like Averroes, confirmed that God has will^^ and 
power.Aquinas’ confirmation that God has these two qualities 
was the same as that used by Averroes, that is, it was based on his 
understanding of divine intelligence and knowledge. Aquinas said 
that, ”God is intelligent. He must be endowed with wili.”^^  He 
went on to show at length that God has will. For example he said,
"The more perfect understanding is, the more delightful it is to tlie one understanding. But God understands and His understanding is most perfect. Therefore, His 
understanding is most full of delight. But intelligible 
delight is through the will, as sensible delight is 
through the appetite of concupiscence. There is, therefore, 
will in God." 62
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Though Aquinas’ argument, as listed by Robert Leet Patterson 
are eight in number,their source is only one - God has knowledge. 
What is clear for us is that Averroes and Aquinas agreed that there 
is one basic source, but Aquinas provided a more elaborate and 
detailed argument than Averroes. As Averroes refered to the Quran, 
Aquinas also refered to Biblical scriptures which affirms the will 
of God, ’’Do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by 
the renewal of your mind, that you may prove what is the will of 
God, what is good and acceptable and perfect.Similarly Aquinas 
proved that God has power because He is pure act, as he had shown 
in his discussion of the existence of God. As pure act God has 
power. Furtliermore, Aquinas also refered to scriptures as his 
authoritative source, "I am God Almighty; walk before Me and be 
blameless.
In our case, Aquinas said, the will is a desire to seek
(36 *things not yet possessed and delighting in what is. This is 
precisely the same as Averroes' statement in his discussion of 
human will. Aquinas added that God’s will is only in the last 
sense, that is delighting in what is, because the principle of His 
will is His own essence.If the principle object of divine will 
be other than the divine essence, it would follow that there is 
some tiling higher than the divine will moving it, while as we have 
known God’s essence is the highest good. Therefore, the principle 
object of His will is His own essence. Aquinas said, however, that
God, in addition to willing Himself, also wills other things which
68are ordered by Him as to their end. God’s moral integrity is 
affirmed by holding that God wills the good of things other than
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Himself. Relativity of deity is avoided by arguing that what moves
God is not the will to the good of the other, but God’s own good- 
69ness. Hie paradigm of the divine will here is the same as that
of God’s knowledge of things other than Himself: as God understands
things, other than Himself, in understanding His own being, so like-
70wise He wills them in willing His own goodness. In other words, 
God does not only will nothing necessarily other than Himself, but, 
also, whatever He wills. He wills witli respect to His own end.
In discussing the power of God, Aquinas spoke of two kinds
of power; active power and passive power. The first concerns power
71in relation to God. Aquinas defined active power as, "a principle
of acting on another," and passive power as "a principle of being
72acted on by another," Moreover, Aquinas explained that power in
God should be conceived as a principle of a thing made, not as a
73principle in action, as our own, because if we understand God's
power as a source of action it means His activity depends on another,
This is impossible, since God’s power is identical with God’s 
74essence.
The scope of God's power as described by Aquinas is that 
75God is omnipotent which means He can do whatever He wishes to do. 
Aquinas, however, reminded us what is meant by "God is omnipotent." 
He said though God can do all. He cannot make something logical 
contradictory, because anything that implies a contradiction does 
not fall under God’s omnipotence.^^ He is almighty because He can 
do everything that is absolutely possible. "Something is judged to 
be possible or impossible from the implication of the terms:
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possible when the predicate is compatible with the subject, for
instance, that Socrates is seated; impossible when it is.not
77compatible, for instance, that man is a donkey," The notion of
omnipotence implies that there is no possible power lacking in God.
Under the concept of omnipotence of God all activities in the world
78should be referred to God as their cause. His power is not limited
79to some particular effect, because if God's power were limited to
some particular effect. He would not be through Himself the cause of
being as such, but of this particular being.This is repugnant to
God as the source of all beings. To show the scope of oimiipotence
of God, Aquinas clarified three characteristics of God’s power: its
universality, its uniqueness, and its absoluteness.^^ It is
universal in that it extends to all things with which the notion of
82being is not incompatible. It is unique in that it is creative;
8 5God alone has the power to create being, as such, out of nothing.
It is absolute in that no effect lies beyond God’s power."God is
able to do everything whatsoever that lies within the potency of
85the created thing."
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that both 
Averroes and Aquinas recognized that God is omnipotent, His power 
is unlimited. There is no great difference in the way in which 
this matter was discussed by Averroes snù Aquinas. However, we 
find a little difference in their approach. For example, Aquinas 
clearly stated that God makes something by will not by necessity 
of His nature.Aquinas gave three reasons for this: first, in
acts by nature, both the end and the means necessary to it have 
to be determined by some superior intelligence, for example an
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arrow’s target is set by an archer. Now since God is the first of
the order of efficient cause, therefore, that which acts.from
intelligence and will follow strictly. Second, God’s being is not
a determinate kind, but contains in itself the whole perfection of
being, and consequently does not act by the determinism of nature.
Hierefore, God acts by the resolution of His intelligence and will.
Third, effects proceed from an efficient cause, and they pre-exist
in a cause according to its mode of being. God’s being is His
actual understanding, creatures pre-exist there as held in His mind,
and so, as being comprehended, they proceed from Him. So also as
God’s being wills. He, therefore, acts according to His will.
Aquinas' argument is reasonable, because if God acts not by His
will it means He has no choice in His action, while God wills things
87other than Himself without necessity. Also, if God acts not by
His will it means there is a super power over His power, and in
consequence of that His activity is under compulsion. This is
impossible. Here was seem to detect a point of difference with
Averroes who said that God acts not by will and election. In fact,
this Averroes’ statement does not mean that God acts without will,
88but God’s willing as we have seen is not the same as hmnan willing. 
TIius Averroes’ denial is tlie denial that God acts by a will such as 
ours.
a. Human power and free will
Averroes in his discussion of human power and free will, or
in philosophical terms, secondary agent, criticized the Ash'arites
who said that man has no power- or acquisition (kasb) in his action.
So tlie Ash^arites’ statement, that a acquisition and the deed done
89are both created by God, is meaningless, because that statement
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still shows that man is under a compulsion in his actions. For 
Averroes, if man is not free to choose what he wills, the 
problem of human obligation (taklif) arises as we have seen earlier.
To avoid this problem Averroes said that man has power, but
91the power is not created by himself, it is given by God. Man’st
power is not absolute, it is under the power of God. This power is
limited, it depends on a condition supplied by God which enables it
92to act. Averroes gave two conditions^  where man can act by the
power given by Gad; first, by our intention and second, by the
’cause’ witli which God has furnished us from without. If one of
them is omitted, our power is not complete and our actions do not
come actually into existence. The causes which God set to work
from witliout are not solely the complete cause of what we wish to
do or prevent being done, but are rather tlie causes of our deciding
93to do one of two contraries. The will in us, Averroes said, is 
the urge to do something from our imagination (takhayyul) or the 
judgement of the truth of something, and this judgement is not our 
choice, but is something which happens to us from events outside 
ourselves.The example given by Averroes is that when something 
desirable is presented to us from outside we desire it involuntarily, 
and move towards it, and similarly when there happens to us some- 
thing repellent from outside, we leave it violently. By this way, 
according to Averroes, our will is preserved and bound up by the 
events from without. This illustration is based on Averroes’ read­
ing of a Quranic verse, "he has attendant angels before him cind
95behind him, watching over him by God’s command." Averroes 
believed that by tliis explanation, of how we can acquire our deeds
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and how far they are governed by predestination, one solves all 
96doubts whicli arise from the apparent contradiction in the Quranic 
verses and also from rational arguments.
Averroes' answer, however, still raises problems, because 
all Muslims are completely in agreement that there is no agent
r
(faHl) except AllaJi. To clarify the statement "there is no agent
except Allall" Averroes gave two answers. First, this statement can
be taken to mean that there is no agent but All all, and that causes
97other than Him cannot be called agents except only metaphorically.
This is because the existence of those causes depends on Him. He
has made them to be causes and has preserved their existence as
creative agents, and has protected their effects after their actions.
God also creates their substances at the time when causes come
together,The second answer is that Averroes distinguished
between two terms "creator" and "agent". All existents, according
to Averroes, consist of two elements: substances or essences, and
99accidents.* The substances or essences are only created by God.
The causesonly have their effect on accidents, not on the substances 
or essences. For example, the sperm gains heat from woman, but the 
creation of the foetus and the soul, which is its life, is only from 
God a l o n e . I n  other words, man and woman are only the agents 
which can change what has already been created by God, while God is 
the real creator of the foetus and the life in it. Therefore, 
Averroes stated that "an agent in the empirical world (al-shaJiid) 
does not create anything, but his action is only to change one 
quality into another ; it does not change non-existence into exis- 
tence.^ '^  ^ For this reason Averroes said that there is no creator
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but God, because the real created things (makhluqj are substances.
Therefore, Averroes' answer is not contradicted by that which is held 
by all Muslims, namely, there is no agent except Allall. This concep 
was derived by Averroes from a Quranic verse, "0 men, a similitude is 
struck; so give your ear to it. Surely those upon whom you call 
apart from God, shall never create a fly, though they blended to­
gether to do it; and if a fly should rob them of aught, they would
never rescue it from him. Feeble indeed alike are the seeker and 
103the sought."
Of the difference between creator and agent as described by 
Averroes, or in other words between creation and action, we can say 
that all human activities are not included in the term creation, 
but are included in the tenn action. Therefore, there is no contro­
versy, according to Averroes' view, between God's power and human 
power. Human power is only to process that which is already created 
by God.
In discussing the difference between "creator" and "agent"
Averroes reached the conclusion that the name of creator (Khaliq) |
is more properly to be applied to God than the name of agent (fa/il), |
because the word "creator" is not shared by any creature, and the ]
meaning of the creator is the inventor (imikhtari^ ) of the j
substances,as mentioned in the Quran, "God created you and that |
which you do."^^^ i
■ i 
IIn Christianity, as well as in Islam, the problem of human j
power and free will is not easily solved. It raises many contre- I
versial ideas among theologians. Since Augustine's day, theologians i
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have faced this problem which "Anselm himself calls a very famous 
question, that of the relation between himian freewill and divine 
grace, forelmowledge and predestination. This, too, was a topic 
of renewed interest in the twelfth centuiy,"^^^ Free will, in 
fact, is a problem for man not for angels because they were created 
in the state of beatitude, and also not for creatures below man, 
such as animals, because they are not endowed with intellect and 
will. For man it is evident that he has been endowed with free 
will, a property inseparable from a rational and free agent.
Augustine plainly said that man has will and free choice 
107in his action.' We are free to do or not to do something. So
"our will is ours and it is our will that affects all that we do
by willing.This means that whatever happens to man against
his will is not really his will but the will of God who gives the
power of realization. Aquinas, as well as Augustine, recognized
109that man is free to make decisions in his action. If man was
not free, councils, exhortation, percept, prohibition, reward and
110punisliment would be pointless. Man's free will, however, is
not beyond God's will. The will of every rational creature ought
to be subject to tiie will of God. Thus, Aquinas said creaturely
freedom involves only the category of assent; the category of real
choice or real alternative belongs within the mystery of God's 
n  1eternity.
There is a linguistic difficulty in the freedom of choice. 
Philosophers in the mediaeval times discussed freedom, the will 
under the "Librium arbitrium." Albert the Great regarded "Librium
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arbitrium" as a power distinct from reason and will which arbitrates
between the dictates of reason and the aim of will in cases where
112there is a conflict of the two. Aquinas rejected Albert’s view,
because free will according to him, is the power by which a man can 
113judge freely. Furthermore, Aquinas said that free will is the 
power of intelligence whicJi makes man master of his own acts, and 
presupposes a providence of his own, wJrereby he can provide for him­
self and for o t h e r s , T o  understand adequately the concept of 
human free will, we should understand three terms together; choice, 
deliberation and reason or intellect. Choice is accomplished in 
a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen.
Every act of free choice is proceeded by a judgement of the reason,
and Aquinas spoke of choice as being formally arr act of the reason,
and the mind or reason can regard any particular good under different
aspects or from different points of view. In regard to the choice
115of a particular good, the will is free. Ihe power of choice is 
essentially voluntary, arrd where there is no choice there is no will. 
Thus Aquinas said that "choice is the taking of one thing in preference 
to another.Deliberation brings us to a point where we observe 
that several means are capable of bringing us to the end toward which
we are tending. Bach of these means pleases us, and to the extent
that it does so, we cleave to it. But of all these means which please 
us, we at least choose one, and such choice belongs properly to an act 
of election.. In deliberation, reason and understanding are required 
to make a judgement.
The will tends to an end (good); the will moves all faculties 
toward their end. Wlien intellect shows the will that a number of
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ways ot acting are possible, there is a corresponding movement of
complacency in the will by whidi it tends toward what is good in
eacli of the proposed possibilities. Though Aquinas distinguished
three terms in relation to free will, sometimes he said free wil 
117is simply ciioice. Thus he said reasoning properly refers to 
our arriving at knowledge of one thing from knowledge of another. 
Willing indicates tlie simple appetite for something, since it is 
desired for its oim sake. Choosing means to seek something for
the sake of something else, hence it is used most strictly in
relating means to an end. Clearly, then, will and free will are 
related in the way that understanding and reasoning are related.
So willing and choosing pertain to the same power but they are 
different acts; willing concerns to the goal and choosing focuses
on the means to obtain the goal.
As touched on briefly at the beginning of this chapter, 
free will in man does not mean that its decision should be put in­
to effect. It, however, is a power to choose one of several 
possibilities of obtaining a goal, because no free decision can 
reach the goal unless God initiates and helps it.^ ^^  This is tlie 
concept of human free will in Aquinas’ thought.
When Aquinas said that a secondary agent can act, this does 
not mean any action performed by a secondary agent happens indepen­
dently of God’s power. Rather it is still under tlie control of 
God, because if creatures have the %iower to create or to add to 
being, then divine power would be qualified, and God would not be 
absolute in p o w e r . G o d  having made man what He is also provides
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the end, means, motive and power whereby man can realize the full 
potentialities of what he can be.
Now man is master of his acts through his reason and will. 
Therefore, free will is said to be a faculty ot will and reason. 
Ihus those acts are properly called "humcin" which proceed from
r
deliberate choice. This means that stretching done without atten­
tion, according to Aquinas, is not properly speaking a human act, 
it lies outside the sphere of freedom. Aquinas’ analysis of free­
dom is markedly intellectualist in character, in the sense that a 
strong emphasis is laid on tlie reason’s function in tree choice. 
Every act of free choice is preceded by a judgement of the reason. 
The mind or reason can regard, any particular good under different 
aspects. Walking, for example, is regarded as something good, as 
tiie fulfilment of a need for exercise. Or it is regarded under 
another aspect as something had, as likely to be a hot and dirty 
business.
Aquinas, then held that man is free in choosing this or 
that particular good. The choice of some particular good may be 
necessary as a means to the attainment of the final end, but when 
we know theoretically that this is tlie case, it is not so evident 
to us tliat we arc unable to regard them from another point of view. 
It may be objected, however, that our choice of this or that parti­
cular end is determined by our character, which in turn is deter­
mined by psychological factors.
Aquinas conceived of freedom as the harmony of will and 
act, and thereby sought to reconcile to each other the idea ot
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divine absolute power and human freedom. By conceiving the power
of the secondary cause as the power to effect, rather than to
create a new being, Aquinas had sought to affirm real creaturely
power without compromising the absolute quality of God’s power.
Furthermore, Aquinas added that the power of God does not only
serve to change or to move something. Changing and moving is a
120kind of quality proper to human beings. Thus Aquinas’ descrip­
tion parallels Averroes' statement that a secondary agent just 
changes a quality of existents, as we have discussed before.
Aquinas also discussed the concept of creation by saying
that "creation is an action proper to God, mid that He alone can 
121create." Here there is no contradiction between the power of
secondary agent and God’s absolute power. This is celar because
tlie right to create is only for God. The concept of creation,
according to Aquinas, does not mean that God brings things into
122being from pre-existing matter. God creates something ex-nihilo, 
Thus once again we find a similarity between Averroes, who 
distinguishes the concept of "creator" and "agent," and Aquinas.
ii. God's justice.
In the foregoing discussion we have dealt with the scope 
of God’s power and will and human freedom in his action. We turn 
now to a discussion of God’s power and human freedom in relation 
of God’s justice.
The justice of God is a crucial controversy which had 
occurred between the Ash^arites, the Mu/tazilites and the philo-
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sophers. Hence we will see that Averroes as a philosopher had 
directed his criticism at the Ash/arites without giving any to the 
Mu'tazilites This problem is based on the concept of good
(al-hasan) and bad (al-Qabh) in action in which the criterion by 
which they are measured is either reason as held by the Mu t^azilites 
and philosophers, or divine law (shar') as held by the Ash^ arites.
The controversy between the Ash'arites and the Mu^tazilites
in relation to God's justice arises from certain Quranic verse;
some of which show that God is just, and others apparently that God
is unjust. An example for the former is, "surely God wrongs not
124men anything, but themselves men wrong." An example for the
latter is, "God leads astry whomsoever He wills, and guides whom-
125soever He wills, and He is the All-mighty, the All-wise."
The Mu^ 'tazilites w]io are well-lcnown as a party of justice 
(alil al-^ adl) said clearly that God is just and wise,^^^ so God 
wills good and must enact what is advantageous to man, and there­
fore, He does not will evil for this would be harmful to man. If
God wills evil. He is unjust. This contradicts the Quranic verse,
127"Thy Lord wrongs not His servants."
Hie justice of God is the first of the Mu^tazilites' 
principles in theology. An important consequence of God's justice 
to action, as understood by the Mu^ tazilites, is that the rewards 
and punishments of man in the next life must be deserved by man, 
and this implies that man must be free in his present life to 
choose between right and wrong conduct. Furthermore, the 
Mu/tazilites' concept of God's justice was that one cannot ascribe
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to God evil and injustice or any act ot unbelief and sin, because
if He created injustice He would be unjust, just as He would be
128just if He created justice. They also agreed that God does only
what is right and good, and being wise He must do what is good for
man. Tliis is the Muftazilites' theory of ethics which is called
129rationalistic objectivism.
The Ash^arites said, according to Averroes, that we cannot
130describe Qid as just or unjust, because He is not under the
obligation (taklif) whicli is placed on His servants. And any action
of someone who is not subject to this condition cannot be predicated
131as either just or unjust. This view was criticized by Averroes 
as being mireasonable and it describes what is not described by the 
Quran. The Ash'arites also held, according to Averroes, that good 
£ind evil are relative things (amr al-i^ tibariy ), for the criterion 
by which something is considered good or bad is revealed law (shar^ ). 
Hie intellect cannot play any role in measuring something as good or 
bad. Hiis, according to the Ash^arites' view, is because something 
good at one time can be changed into bad at another time. For 
extunple, killing someone is bad for it is prohibited by revealed law, 
but it can be changed to good when God requires the reprisal carried 
out by a killer. Thus the Ash^arites* view, according to Averroes,
13?contradicts the revealed law and reason. “ Justice, according to
him, is not a relative thing, but it is evident tliat justice is good
[khayr) and injustice is wicked (sharr). On the other hand, God has
repudiated injustice Himself, saying, "Thy Lord wrongs not His 
133servants."
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134Averroes firmly stated that God is just * as did the
Mu'tazilites. Hiis is because God has described Himself as righteous
(qist) and has denied that He is a wrongdoer. There are mæiy Quranic
verses which support Averroes’ view, for example, the verse already
mentioned above. Besides, Averroes said, if we assume that God is
not just, then we falsify what is rationally perceived of things
135whidi are just and unjust in themselves. So we cannot predicate 
injustice of God, because injustice is applied to those who conduct 
or adiinnister something whidi does not belong to them. But God 
dominates the heavens and the earth and anything between them. 
Eveiything in this universe belongs to God, He can do whatever He 
wishes. If this is so, we cannot attribute injustice to God. On 
this point Averroes’ view is similar to the Mu^tazilites’. If so, 
in tills context Averroes ’ ethics can be also described as rationa­
listic objectivism.
Averroes, however, reminded us not to confuse God’s justice 
and human justice. Man acts justly, according to him, in order that 
he may gain some good by justice in itself whidi would not exist for 
himself if he were not to act justly. When we act justly we feel 
happiness and satisfaction, since we have fulfilled a good by our 
act twoards another, But God acts justly not because His essence is 
perfected by justice or because He feels happiness or satisfaction, 
but because His perfection itself requires that He acts justly. If 
we assume that God's justice is of the same kind as man’s, it be­
comes necessary to admit there is some defect in Him, This imper­
fection, as we have already seen, is impossible for God.
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Though Averroes refered to the many Quranic verses to prove
that God is just, he also realized that tliere are some verses in the
Quran itself which apparently show that God is unjust. For example,
"God leads astray whomsoever He wills, and guides whosoever He wills,
137and He is the All-mighty,the All-wise," and the like. The ques­
tion arising drom this verse is, is the misleading of a servant just 
or unjust? The apparent meaning of this verse is, of course, that 
God is unjust because He brings man to error and then punishes him. 
But Averroes said that such a verse cannot be understood in its 
literal meaning; it should be interpreted allegorically, for there
are many other verses which contradict it^ ^^  For example, "He
139approves not unthankfulness in His ser\/-ant," This verse, Averroes 
said, shows that since God would not approve the infidelity of His 
servants. He does not mislead them.^^^ Thus Averroes’ view is quite 
apposed to the Ashlarites’ view who hold that it is possible for God 
to do something whidi He does not want. This view, according to
14?Averroes, is infidelity.
Averroes tried to reconcile the apparent contradictions in 
tlie Quranic verses by inteipreting allegorically those verses that 
show God is the cause of error. Those verses, in fact, according 
to him, refer to the pre-arranged divine will (mashi^ at) that some 
existents tend to err by their nature and are pronpted to it by in­
ner and external causes. Therefore, Averroes said that those verses
are misleading concerning the evil nature, in the same way that
143beneficial foods can be hanivful to sick bodies. Any Quranic verse 
which apparently shows that God misleads man, according to Averroes, 
does not mean that God wills evil for him, rather it shows that God
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creates men, and they have the ability to choose between good and
evil.^ ^^  The ability is guided by intellect in choosing good or
bad conduct. The interpretation of the Quranic verses allegorically
in this matter is necessary so as to avoid imputing a dualism in God.
llius causing confusion in the human mind (Muslims) by speaking of
God as the creator of good and the creator of evil, as happened in
Zoroastrianism.In Islam, good and evil are created by God, and
God’s creation of evil, according to Averroes, is for the sake of
good. In this way His creation of evil would be quite just.^ ^  ^The
example given by Averroes is that the punis liments which are ordained
by governors of cities are evils, but they are instituted for the
sake of the good - for the peace of the whole cities. Therefore,
the punisliment ordained by the governors cannot be regarded as evil.
In the same way this is applied to God. The existence of evil is
inevitable for the existence of good. So Averroes said that there
exists among good things some that can only exist with an admixture
of evil. Therefore, the divine wisdom ordained, according to the
philosophers, that a great quantity of good should exist although
147it had to be mixed with a small quantity of evil.
The Quranic verses quoted by Averroes in this matter, at
least show that God has classified two kinds of man; one good, and
the other evil. This raises in our minds the question - what is
God’s purpose in distinguishing some men who, by their nature, are
prepared to err which is the worst kind of injustice? Averroes’
answer was that it is the wisdom of God (hikmat ilahiyyat) to do 
148so, and the nature of men comiposed of a rational and animal 
soul,^ "^  ^requires that a small quantity of them err by their
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n a t u r e . A s  human beings they have been given guidance, they
also have been exposed to the misleading, that is, they have been
151led away from God, or to evil in a small number. We, as servants 
of God, have no right to ask why God does this and that as is men­
tioned in the Quran, "He shall not be questioned as to what He does, 
but they shall be questioned." According to Averroes, though evil 
exists, its existence is much less than good, Theis when good is 
mucli greater then evil in proportion, then the wisdom of God requires 
to do evil. It is well known, Averroes said, that the existence of
much good with a little evil is better than the non-existence of
152much good for the sake of a little evil. For example, fire has 
been made because of its necessity for the existence of certain 
things, and without it they could not have existed at all. It, of 
course, destroys some existent things. If we, however, think of 
the destruction caused by that fire and then coiipare this destruc­
tion to the advantages which we derive from it, we find that its
existence is better than its non-existence. Thus the existence of
153fire is good though it contains evil.
In the case of evil, sometimes our intellect cannot explore 
the nystery of its reality. Our intellect cannot describe for what 
purpose God has created it. Just as it was with angels when God 
informed them that He was going to create on the earth a man (Adam), 
and they questioned God; "Wliat wilt tliou set therein one who will 
do corruption, and shed blood, while we proclaim lliy praise and 
call Thee Holy? He said. Assuredly I know that you know not."^^^ 
From this, Averroes reached a conclusion that since good and evil 
are found mixed in the world and the good predominates over the
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evil, then the divine wisdom requires that evil should be so and
155thus its existence is not negated.
Aquinas also insisted, as did Averroes, that God is just.
He also shared with Averroes the idea that God's justice is different
from man's justice. Thus to distinguish the justice of God from the
justice of man, Aquinas spoked of two kinds of justice; commutative 
157and distributive. The former justice occurs in all activities of 
human beings which cover the whole range of present property rela­
tions, and Aquinas gave an exliaustive list of such relations: buying, 
selling, trade, commerse and the like. This justice, according to 
Aquinas, cannot be attributed to God, because no one gives to Him 
that it should be rendered to Him again. The latter kind of justice, 
distributive justice, is the righteousness of a ruler, displayed in 
a well-ordered community through its head and manifests itself in 
both natural and moral beings which set forth God's justice. This 
justice belongs to God for He gives to every creature according to 
its nature and dignity.
Aquinas, like Averroes, faced the fact that contradictory 
ideas occur in scripture and he too tried to reconcile tliem. There 
are some verses in scripture which attests the justice of God. For 
example, "The Lord is just and loves justice,"Let no one say 
when he is tempted, I am tempted by God, for God cannot be tempted . 
with evil."^ ^^  But there are other verses which show that God is 
unjust. For example, "Go in to Pharoali; for I have hardened his 
heart and the heart of his servants, that I may show these signs of 
mine among them,"^^^ "0 Lord, why dost thou malce us err from they
160
ways and harden our heart, so that we fear thee not?"^ ^^  According 
to Aquinas the two latter verses, and other verses whidi-are 
similar to them, do not show that God is unjust, rather they should 
be understood as meaning that "God does not grant to some people 
His help in avoiding sin while to others He does grant it 
Aquinas stressed that we cannot say at all that God does lead men 
to sinful action. Men sin because they turn away from God who is 
tlieir ultimate e n d . T h i s  means, according to Aquinas, that God 
does not direct men to do evil, but they themselves by their own 
nature turn from God who is their ultimate felicity. Aquinas' 
eiqdanation of those texts, which suggest that God is unjust, 
parallels Averroes' in as sudi both interpret those verses in re­
lation to the idea that God is tlie highest good and He does not 
will evil. Men do evil because their nature urges them to do it,
not because God ordains it.
Averroes and Aquinas, in interpreting any verses implying 
the injustice of God in their different scriptures, tried to avoid 
attributing injustice to God. Their answer, however, cannot 
completely satisfy our intellect. Their answers are a justifica­
tion to the positive verses which attest that God is just and
merciful. The question might arise, why did they only interpret 
allegorically or symbolically the negative verses without giving 
a similar interpretation to the positive verses? Aquinas stated
fiiinly that "in every one of God's works justice and mercy are 
found,^ ^  ^and then he re; 
are mercy and truth.
ound,and fered to scripture, "all the patlrs of Lord
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Aquinas, like Averroes, recognized that God separates men 
into two divisions, namely, to some God gives grace and guides 
them to His path, and tlie others He leaves in error. It is evident 
from our experience that God gives sight to the blind, or life to 
the dead, but He does not enlighten all the blind, or heal all who 
are infirm. ’ Though these things are apparently unjust according 
to our judgement, we still cannot say that God is unjust, because 
there is a purpose in His action. God’s purpose in this matter, 
according to Aquinas, is that :
"the working of His power may be evident in the case of 
those whom He heals, and in the case of the others the 
order of nature may be observed, so also He does not 
assist with His help all who impede grace so that they may be turned away from evil and toward the good, but only some, in whom He desires His mercy to appear, so 
that the order of justice may be manifested in the other cases.” 166
The Aquinas’ answer is roughly similar to that of Averroes, who 
said that the division of men into two kinds - some God guides and 
others He misleads. Thus is required by divine wisdom which is 
beyond our intellect.
There is, then, some similarity between Averroes and 
Aquinas in answering the question of why God helps some and not 
others. Aquinas said there is no reason to ask why He converts 
certain sinners to His guidance and leaves the others. For all 
things in this world depend upon His will a l o n e . H e  can do 
whatever He wishes. Aquinas’ answer is strengthened by scripture, 
’’Does not the potter have authority over the clay to make from the 
same lump one vessel for an honorable use, smother for a dish-
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onourable use?.168
In the case of moral evil, Aquinas tried to avoid saying 
tliat it is from God; rather it is from man. To show that the evil 
deed is not from God, Aquinas said that every sin stems from a 
defect in tlie proximate agent, not from the influence of the 
primar)'' agent. For example, some defect may occur in the product 
of a skilled artisan because of some defect in his instrument, not 
in his skill.
There is, however, a dissimilarity between Averroes and
170Aquinas in relation to evil. Averroes clearly seated that evil
is created by God, while Aquinas stated it is not caused by God.
171Evil, according to Aquinas, is only a privation of good, and
172God, the highest good, cannot bear any mingling with evil.
173They, however, agreed that God does not will evil.
Aquinas, as well as Averroes, answered the question, what
is the purpose of the existence of evil in this world? He said
that the nature of law is that some things are good and some bad,
or that something is good and the other better. So to maintain
the perfection of the universe it requires inevitably good and
evil, because many goods are present in things ehich would not
174occur unless there were evil. For example there would not be 
a place for the justice of vindication if there were no offences. 
Therefore the existence of offences is necessary to establish 
justice, because the benefit of justice for society is more 
than destruction of offences. Aquinas' answer in relation to the 
existence of good and evil is precisely the same to Averroes'. 
Moreover, Aquinas added, "if evil were totally excluded from the
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whole of things by divine providence, a multitude of good things
would to be s a c r i f i c e d , because good depends on evil.
Again if evil were removed from some part of the universe, mudi
177perfection would perish from tlie universe. whose beauty arise
from an ordered unification of evil and good things. Thus, the
existence of'evil in Aquinas' view is beneficial to the stability
of the universe as a whole. For instance, an artisan hides the
foLuidation beneath the earth, so that the whole house may have
stability. It is by such argument that Aquinas showed that we
cannot say that God is unjust because of the existence of some
evils, since beyond its existence there is a benefit. In answering
that in things there are good and evil, Aquinas' view once again
was similar to Averroes' view where Aquinas said that "the good is
178better known from its comparison with evil," as the good which
exists in fire is greater than its potential for evil. So, also,
the divine regime, which governs the whole universe especially
huiian beings, provides for them things governed according to their
modes. Their actions, to attain goodness as their end, unavoidably
causes some defect which is regarded as evil, and while we continue
to suffer certain evil our desire for good grows more ardent. Tlius,
Aquinas said that it is not the function of God's providence totally 
179to abolish evil. To support his view, that evil also exists
beside the existence of goodness, Aquinas quoted two verses from
scripture; "I font light and create darkness, I make meal and
create woe, I am the Lord, who do all these things,and, "Does
181evil befall a city, unless the Lord has done it."
Ihe conclusion, from the point of view given by Averroes
164 -
and Aquinas, is that we cannot say that God is unjust simply because 
evil exists in this life since "while evil things which are small in 
number originate from good things that are defective, still certain
1 Q Ogood things also result from them." Briefly, we find many simila­
rities of ideas in Averroes' and Aquinas' discussion of this matter.
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G. THE CONCEPT OF PREDESTINATION
This is the climax of the discussion of this chapter. Once 
we understand God's will, power and justice, and human freedom, it 
is probably not too difficult to ruiderstand the concept of predes­
tination by God.
y
At the beginning of this chapter the problem of predestina­
tion was touclied on both in Christian teaching and in Islam. In 
Islamic theology the problem of predestination is centered in the
Quranic texts which have been already discussed before. The dis-
183cussion covers three major theological schools: the Mu^ tazilites
the Jabarites and the Ash^arites, The general view of the 
Mu'^ tazilites is that man is as though not subject to predestination, 
because they hold that man is the creator of his action whether 
good or evil.^ ^  ^ The Jabarites hold that man is really subject to 
the predestination by God because they deny that actions originate 
from man attributing them to God.^ ^^
In Islamic theology the term predestination is well-known 
as "qada"' and "qadar". The foinner is God's loiowledge of things 
in relation to their circumstances, and tlie latter is His creation 
for them when their causes exist.Predestination must be i
believed by every Muslim because it is one of the pillars of faith.
The source of controversy in predestination, whether in 
Cliristianity or in Islam, is based on two factors: human respon­
sibility and God’s omnipotence. We have already discussed both of 
these in our treatment of the concept of Grd's omnipotence and of 
human free will.
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Averroes realized the controversy relating to the
predestination of God among theological schools, and also he
realized what is apparently contradictory in the Quranic texts. In
some circumstances he critized the MuHazilites view because their
view appears to challenge God's absolute power. He criticized the
Jabarites' view because they deny human free will and of course,
this means they deny human responsibility. He also criticized the
Ash a^rites' view because their view, according to him, is not
rational and contradicts revealed law. The general concept of
predestination in Islamic theology is that whatever happens in this
world is under the providence of God. Tiiis is clear from a verse
in the Quran, "With Him are the keys of the imseen; none knows them
but He. He knows what is in land and sea; not a leaf falls, but He
knows it. Not a grain in the earth's shadow, not a thing fresh or
187withered, but it is in a Book Manifest," When God knows all things 
then those things must happen.
In addition to the Quranic verses mentioned earlier in
relation to predestination, there are two other verse, one which
shows that man is predestined and the other shows that man is not.
For the former, is the verse, "God has set a seal on their heart
183and on their hearing, and on their eyes is a covering." For the 
latter is the verse, "Say: the truth is from your Lord; so let whoso­
ever will believe, and let whosoever will disbelieve.llie first 
verse shows that man is absolutely predestined, because he cannot do 
more activities thaii that which is fixed by God. Hie second verse 
shows that man is free to choose whatever he wishes because God 
offers him a choice of ways to follow. In the light of tliis apparent
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contradiction in the Quran, Averroes tried to explain tlie concept
of predestination by God. His method in this case is nearer to
the Mu^tazilites though he disagreed with certain of their view,
than to the Jabarites or the Ash^arites. Averroes, as we have seen,
recognized that human power and free will given by God can be put
into practice. Thus man should be responsible for his actions.
For Averroes, free will was the basis of humcin obligation in their
conduct. Averroes, liowever^ did not say that hiunan power and free
will are absolute. In other words they cannot do whatever they
wish without any relationship with God. Their power is still
under the power of God. Averroes said that human power is effective
under two conditions as we noted earlier. Our power should be
consistent and should correspond with external causes, and these
external causes, according to Averroes are called "qadar” of God.^^ ^
These external causes assist us or help us to complete our action.
This human actions are not completely voluntaiy, because they are
still tied by external causes, and also not completely involuntaiy
because the external causes can effect an action when the will of
191the agent responds to them. According to Averroes’ view, the
external and internal cause cannot be separated. They can be
distinguished, but must always be held together. The internal
cause, whicli we call "ivill", and the external causes follow general
lules which are not mutually contradictory. These general rules
have been characterized recently by Dr. ffelimud Qasim as determinism
192in natural science.
Averroes, of course did not describe at length the concept 
of the predestination, because the reality of predestination cannot
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be explored adequately by our intellect. However, he gave a brief
summary of his view of predestination. He stated, "the limited
arrangement in the external and internal causes is called fate and
predestination (qada’ and qadar) which God has prescribed for His
— 1 Q 5servant. This is known as "The Preserved Table" (Lawh Wifuz) 
Therefore the'concept of "qada"' and "qadar" according to Averroes 
is :
"the limited system which God has established in internal 
and external cause. Our will is preserved and bound up by 
what happens from outside." 194
The concept which is described by Averroes was derived from
a Quranic verse, namely "he has attendant angels, before him and
behind him, watching over him by God’s c o m m a n d . T h e  external
causes, according to Averroes, are not a human role, rather they are
set out by God in a limited arrangement (nizim malidud) which does
not interfere with what the Maker had ordained. Furthermore,
Averroes stated that our will and our acts are not completed unless
there is harmony and agreement with the external cause. Even with
this harmony and agreement our acts are exercised in a limited 
196arrangement, ' namely, they are found at fixed times and in fixed 
quantity. This is necessary because acts are the effects of those 
causes which are extemal to us; and all effects whidi result from 
limited cause are themselves necessarily limited and are found in 
a given quantity only. God’s knowledge of these causes and that 
which pertains to them is the cause of their existence. But no one 
has full knowledge of these causes except God alone who is the knower 
of the reality of unseen things (al-ghayb), Averroes once again 
refered to the Quran, ’ "say: None Imows the unseen in the heavens
169
197and earth except God,"
Since the order and the arrangement of causes is what 
requires the existence of a thing at certain times and its non- 
existence at another, then there must be a knowledge of existence 
or non-existence of a thing at certain times. In this way Averroes 
prepared the way for his idea of the divine knowledge which is not 
dependent on the apparence of objects of knowledge in actuality.
In this way, too, Averroes stated, we remove the controversy in 
our intellect in relation to predestination of God. In other words 
wlien our will is combined together witli external causes, the exis­
tence of being becomes an actuality. When the deeds are referred
only to one of these tvm conditions, either intemal or external,
j ' 198doubts arise.
In Averroes discussion of predestination the problem of 
whether man’s action had been fixed by God or not, or whether man 
has power to do or not to do something does not arise at all, 
because, in Averroes’ view, predestination is not to be understood 
in tlie tenus set by the Mu^tazilites, the Jabarites, and the 
Ash^arites. Rather predestination is nothing but the whole system 
including both internal and external causes, which is set out by 
God.
Aquinas, also faced a problem similar to Averroes’ problem
in that some philosophers such as Democritus had denied the
predestination by God. According to Aquinas, Democritus said that
199the natural cause of a thing is exempt from divine providence.
200The world was fashioned by chance. Some held that only immortal
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things came under divine providence, whereas mortal things are
201subject only in their species. St. Augustine also stated that
"we do not say that everything is fated, in fact we deny that any-
202thing happens by destiny." Augustine made this denial because 
he held firmly to human freedom. Furthermore he says :
"If there is for God a fixed order of all causes, it does not follow that nothing depends on our free choice. Our wills themselves are in the order of causes, which is, 
for God, fixed, and is contained in His foreknowledge, 
since human acts of will are the causes of human acti­
vities. Therefore, He who had prescience of the causes of all events certainly could not be ignorant of our decision, which He forelaiows as tlie causes of our action."
Aquinas firmly stated that "not only human beings but also
angels, as well, are predestined, though they are never unhappy.
This means Aquinas dones not deny that human are predestined by God.
This is because Biblical scripture itself mentions predestination.
205For example, "and those whom He predestined He also called," and 
the like, Aquinas’ affirmation that human beings are predestinated 
does not mean that they have no power or free will to do something. 
They can exercise their will or power in their activities in 
accordance with the providence of God.
Predestination, in general, is the doctrine that all events
that have happened, are happening, and will happen haven been
predetermined to happen by God.^^^  For Aquinas predestination does
not concern anything in the predestined but only in Him who 
207predestines. In other words, it is not tlie function of the 
creature, rather it is the function of God who governs the whole 
universe. The concept of predestination, according to Aquinas is
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a plan existing in God's mind, for the ordering of some persons to
• 208 salvation.
In Aquinas’ discussion of the predestination by God he
related it very close to providence. There are two sides of
providence. First, the planned purpose of things provided. Second,
its execution which is called government. For the first, God
provides for all things immediately and directly. This means that
all activities in the world are anticipated in God's mind. God
foreloiown something before it happens. For the second, divine
providence works through intermediaries, for God governs the lower
210til rough the higher. Though Aquinas said that divine providence
rules all things, not only in their general nature but also as an
individual, this does not mean that God excludes the activities of 
211secondary agents. The secondary agents arc still functional to
their activities. The fimction of God’s providence is not to fix
a certain act which should be performed, especially by human beings,
213but to plan things to and end.
Aquinas’ concept of predestination, as well as Averroes’,
did not mean God had already fixed some one to do certain things
in a certain time and in a certain place but as a framework exposed
to creatures and they carry it out in their actions. It did not put
213anything into the predestined.
The view of predestination given by Averroes and Aquinas 
appear resonable and acceptable. Some problems,however, still 
stir our mind. For example, both recognized that everything that 
happens in this world is under the providence of God. If Averroes
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concept of predestination is a system arranged by God, and man 
reacts according to the system, this means his action is.still 
subject to that system. Therefore free will is meaningless. If 
Aquinas' concept of predestination is as a plan wliich exists in 
God’s mind, then man reacts according to that which exists in the 
plan, no more than that. If something happens outside of that 
plan, this means the providence of God is not complete. This is 
impossible. Averroes would reply that our intellect cannot explain 
adequately the concept of predestination, because that is God's 
business not ours. Aquinas also replied that "if predestination 
were revealed to some by special privilage, it were better not 
revealed to everyone; that would breed despair in the non-predestined, 
and negligence in the predestined.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION
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C O N C L U S I O N
Both Averroes and Aquinas were part of a philosophical 
development in which tlie controversy between religion and philoso­
phy was central. For both the Christian and Islamic religions in 
the Middle Ages faced a similar problem regarding the development 
of philosophy.
Tlie focus of the discussion in this thesis has been a 
comparison of the ideas of Averroes and Aquinas regarding certain 
aspects of their understanding of God.
1. In the discussion of the general doctrine of God there is 
no major controversy between Averroes and Aquinas. Their separate 
discussion agreed on the point that human nature requires to know 
God. Intellect has tlie capacity to know God through the likeness 
which exists in creatures as God’s effect.
However, Aquinas’ explaination on how human nature requires 
to know God is more detailed than tliat of Averroes. Averroes just 
refered to tlie Quranic texts which show that human beings recognize 
that God exists.
2. Averroes’ and Aquinas’ discussion are also in agreement on
tlie point that there are two ways by which man can know the nature 
of God: the negative and the affirmative way. The negative way
proceeds by denying all imperfections as attributes of God, and the 
affirmative way proceeds by affirming that God has perfect attri­
butes . Once again Aquinas’ description in this matter is more 
detailed than that of Averroes.
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They also shared a similar outlook in regard to the naming 
of God. In their commentaries on Aristotle, they called- God The 
Pure Act, The Pure Intellect, The First Principle and The First 
Unmoved kfover, and when they refered to their oivn scriptures, they 
just called God one name. Averroes called God, All all and Aquinas 
called Old, He IVho is.
3. There is also agreement between Averroes and Aquinas in 
tliat we can predicate some attributes of God and creatures in an 
analogical way, and they both also denied that the attributes of 
God and creatures can be understood in a univocal way. They, how­
ever, departed from one another in the case of the equivocal way. 
Averroes confirmed that some attributes of God and creatures can
be predicted in equivocal names, as we have seen in this discussion 
of God’s will and knowledge. Aquinas rejected tliis idea.
Averroes did not describe, at length or systematically, the 
concept of analogy between God and creature, while Aquineis once 
again was more thorough than Averroes. However, even he did not 
offer a fully systematised account. The basis of analogy as used 
by Averroes and Aquinas in predicating some attributes of God and 
creatures is the likeness which we can find on both sides. The 
analogy employed by Averroes and Aquinas in applying predicates to 
God and creatures are not used precisely in the sajiie sense, but not 
in a totally different sense, either,
4. There is also agreement in that both men stated that the 
essence and attributes of God are one and the same, but their 
reasons of why God’s essence and attributes are the same are
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different. For Averroes, if the essence and attributes of God are 
not the same, this means there are two necessary beings...This is 
impossible. For Aquinas, if God’s attributes are not identical 
with God's essence, this means God's essence is a cimposite thing.
Til is is also impossible. Averroes' and Aquinas’ discussions are 
also in agreement in many circonstances on the other aspects of the 
doctrine of Cod, for example, the eternity of God, the simpleness 
of God, tlie perfection of God, and the like. One difference between 
them is the concept of anthropomoiqihism in relation to God. Averroes, 
so it seems to us did not deny firmly corporeality of God, nor did 
the affirm it in the ordinary sense in which we use the concept of 
corpreality. He prefered to follow the Quranic method which 
mentions clearly the concept of anthropomorphism on God, Against 
this Aquinas clearly denied any form of corporeality of God,
5, Averroes’ and Aquinas ' agree that tlie existence of God is
demonstrable. For Averroes, the existence of God can be demonstrated 
only through physics not metaphysics, but Aquinas apparently accepted 
both, physics and metaphysics,
Averroes offered two proofs of the existence of God, and 
Aquinas presented Five Ways to prove the existence of God. Averroes 
proofs and Aquinas' proofs were both based on observable facts in 
the universe. That is different is that Averroes' proofs do not 
contain philosophical conceptions, rather they were derived from 
the Quranic verses. Aquinas’ proofs stand at the opposite pole of 
those of Averroes in that they are carefully developed philosophical 
arguments.
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There is only one similarity between Averroes’ proof and 
Aquinas' proof, and that is in Averroes' proof of providence and 
Aquinas' proof of design or final cause. Though there is simila­
rity in these two proofs, Averroes' proof is more detailed and its 
scope is wider than Aquinas' proof.
6. In the discussion of God's knowledge we find similarity
and dissimilarity in the thinking of Averroes and Aquinas. They 
both stated that God is intelligent. Their reasons are the same 
in that they are based on scriptures and on human experience in 
observing the universe. The rational arguments developed by them 
are virtually the same.
The focus of their discussion of God's knowledge was on 
three things: First, God's knowledge of contingent events; second,
whether God's knowledge of them is universal or particular; third, 
God's knowledge and human Imowledge.
6a. In the discussion of God's knowledge of contingent events,
Averroes' discussion departs from similarity with Aquinas's dis­
cussion. Averroes stated that God does not Icnow other things than 
Himself, This statement of Averroes does not mean that God ignores 
all existents. With God the intellect and the thing known are the 
sajne in every aspect. The reasons Averroes gave for this are 
consistent with his overall view of God and His relation the world. 
Aquinas clearly said that God knows contingent events, and the 
reasons he gave for this are also consistent with his overall 
position.
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In consequence of this discussion, the views held by 
Averroes and Aquinas disagree on the question of whether'God's 
knowledge increases or does not increase by Icnowing contingent 
events, Averroes stated that there is the possibility that plura­
lity exists in God’s knowledge, but we do not know the nature of 
the plurality in God’s knowledge. Aquinas stated that God’s laiow- 
ledge does not increase by knowing other things, because His know­
ledge is not discursive.
Averroes' and Aquinas' views also disagree on the question 
of whether God's Imowledge of events before or after their existence 
is the same or not. Averroes stated that God's knowledge of exis­
tence and non-existence is different, because if it is not different, 
this menas the knowledge of everything, the loiowlege of past, present 
and future, is the same, and this is clearly impossible. Aquinas 
stated that God îaïows them together with no past, no present and no 
future.
6b, Averroes' and Aquinas^  views that God's knowledge is not
universal, are also similar but the reasons they gave for why God's 
knowledge is not universal were different.
Aquinas disagreed with Averroes with regard to God's know­
ledge of particular, Averroes denied that God’s Imowledge is 
universal and particular, while Aquinas denied the former and 
affilmed the latter.
6c. The last part of their discussion in relation to God's know­
ledge concerns the distinction between God's knowledge and human
1 9 1
knowledge. In Averroes' view, by distinguishing two kinds of 
knowledge, we can also solve two big problems: whether-God knows
or does not know other things than Himself, and whether His know­
ledge is universal or particular.
There is agreement between Averroes and Aquinas' view tliat 
God's knowledge is the cause of all existents and human Imowledge 
is tlie effect of them, but Aquinas did not use this as a criterion 
to show the difference between God's Imowledge and liimian knowledge 
For Aquinas, the difference between the two kinds of laiowledge is 
that God's knowledge is His own essence, while human knowledge is 
a quality of his essence,
Aquinas disagreed with Averroes' statement that God's 
knowledge and human knowledge are equivocal, because, arrording 
to Aquinas, the way we can speak about God in relation to the 
creature is only analogical.
7. In the discussion of the doctrine of predestination we
have seen that Christianity and Islam share the same problem.
Tills problem can be traced to scripture. Many theologians of 
both religions have disagreed with one another in their under­
standing and description of the concept of predestination.
Tliis discussion focuses on three things:
(i) The will and power of God: There is no fundamental
disagreement between Averroes and Aquinas on this matter. 
They each gave their own reasons for asserting that God 
has will and power, and each also refered to his own
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scripture. They are in agreement that God’s will and 
power is absolute, everything that happens in the. imiverse 
is under the will and power of God.
Averroes’ and Aquinas view are also in agreement that human 
beings have the power to act and are free to choose good or 
evil in their actions. Averroes and Aquinas recognized that 
these two qualities are given by God to men and are the 
bases of their responsibility for their actions. They were 
also in agreement that though men can act, their actions 
are limited for their actions are still subject to the 
power of God. Furthermore, there is agreement between them 
that men's power cannot create something, but only can 
change existents into varieties of quality, while God's 
power is to create something from non-existence to existence
(ii) God's justice: Averroes and Aquinas held a similar view
that God is wholly just and we cannot say that God is 
unjust in any aspect. To show this, they refered to their 
own scripture. They faced the same problem when they 
refered to their own scripture, because in the scripture 
of each tliere are many verses that show that God is just, 
and some apparently show that God is unjust.
To solve this problem Averroes and Aquinas had a similar 
tendency, that is, they tried to interpret, the negative 
verses in order not to contradict the positive verses. 
Averroes and Aquinas made virtually the same statement to 
the effect that we have no right to ask God why He does
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this or that, because everything in the cuiiverse belongs 
to Him.
Touching on the question of the existence of evil, Averroes 
and Aquinas similarly held that a small amount of evil is 
necessary to maintain the whole goodness of creation, and 
to exclude evil totally is not the function of God's 
providence. There is however disagreement in their views 
about tlie cause of evil. For Averroes, evil is created 
by God, while, for Aquinas, evil is not caused by God, 
rather it is a privation of Good.
(iii) The concept of predestination: There is agreement between
Averroes and Aquinas on the point that human beings are 
predestined by God. But the concept of predestination as 
understood by each of them does not mean that men's actions 
have been fixed already in eternity. Their descriptions of 
predestination are the same, but the manner of their 
expression is different. For Averroes, predestination is 
a system which God has established in both internal and 
external causes. For Aquinas, predestination is a plan 
which exists in God's mind and is arranged to an end.
Averroes and Aquinas, however, faced the same problem.
Their explanation of the concept of predestination cannot 
satisfy all minds. Thus they reached the conclusion that 
predestination is God's business, not ours.
From what we have seen in the study we have conducted,
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we can make some concluding remarks:
First, it is clear that Averroes and Aquinas praised 
Aristotle's contribution to human thoughts and in many circums­
tances their philosophical thought is Aristotle’s but this does 
not mean that they agreed with ever)^ thing derived from him and so 
they took what they regarded as correct, and rejected what they 
regarded as wrong. They also recognized the absoluteness of 
revelation as words of God, and at the same time, they also agreed 
that reason is weaker and limited in these matters and therefore 
it should be enlightened by the grace of God.
We can see Averroes' attitude towards the masses in his 
discussion of Good. Though he was an intellectual, he did not 
neglect the masses, the majority of people. He gave priority to 
them in His discussion of God. He realized that the masses have 
no high intellectual capability to understand complicated things. 
Therefore, we find him striving for simple proofs and argimients 
in his theology. His proofs are easily understood by the laity,
Averroes really believed that every verse in the Quran is 
suitable to be understood by every level of human mind, the learned 
and the masses. Thus all his proofs about God were derived from 
Quranic texts. This, however, does not mean that he denied all 
intellectual proofs or considered any proof containing logical and 
philosophical premises as useless. He even used them in certain 
circumstances. This can be seen in his Tahafut al-Taliafut where 
we find the intellectual argument is raised.
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Aquinas’ attitude towards the use of argument in relation 
to God was different from those of Averroes, Aquinas' ]?roofs ai'e 
closer to the learned than to the masses. This, as we have seen, 
is clear in the Summa Contra Gentles. The arguments exploited by 
Aquinas in this work are based on philosophical conceptions. The. 
reason why he did this was, as we have seen, that he faced intel­
lectual controversy during his teaching in Paris, He, however, did 
not overlook the Christian beginners in the study of Christian 
theology, presenting the easier way as we have seen in the Summa 
Theologiae, In this work he did not use so many sophisticated 
explanations about God, but inevitably some philosophical elements 
still persisted. Of course, the unlearned could Icnow with the 
certitude of faith what the intellectual knows by renowned argument.
Second, if we observe the entire discussions of Averroes 
and Aquinas in this thesis we find more similarities than dissimi­
larities. Sometimes their expression seems contradictory, but when 
we go into detail they are closer than they appear to be at first 
sight. For example, in their discussions of whether God knows or 
does not know other things than Himself, there are many similarities 
Tlie difference in their reference to scripture is that Averroes 
started his arguments from the Quranic texts, and then elaborated 
tliem in a simple way which was gearëd to the understanding of the 
masses. As for Aquinas, he opened his discussion by using intellec­
tual arguments and ended up by referring to scripture. He did not 
elaborate his arguments from scripture, rather he refered to it as 
an authoritative source to support his arguments.
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We also find weaknesses in the arguments used by Averroes 
and Aquinas. This is unavoidable, since not only were they both 
men of their times, they were fallible human beings. For example, 
in Averroes* argument about God's knowledge, he made complicated 
assumptions which are not easily understood, and puts our mind in 
a dilemma, while he himself stressed many times in his treatises 
that we should use simple arguments as required by revealed law 
(shar^ j. So, too, we find some weaknesses in Aquinas* arguments 
when we relate them to subsequent developments in learning. For 
example’, his theory of motion apparently conflicts with Newton's 
First Law. In fact, in his five ways of the existence of God there 
are many criticismes which have been raised by modern writers. 
Nevertheless, we should remember that Aquinas spoke in mediaeval 
times and, therefore, his intellect.ua.lism should be measured in 
accordance with the intellectual environnent of that age.
Tliird, we can say, though this is infrequent, that Averroes' 
ideas influenced Aquinas’ thought^  This can be seen in the many 
reference made by Aquinas to Averroes, though the purpose of his 
reference often may have been to refute Averroes' ideas, For 
example, Aquinas refered to Averroes in his fifth proof of the 
existence of God. And, of course, both showed the influence of 
Aristotle.
From the auldior’s point of view Averroes and Aquinas carried 
great authority in their own field. Their works still live and are 
being studied in institutions of higher learning. Aquinas was one 
of the pinnacles of Christian, especially Roman Catholic thought
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and he was arguably a typical intellectualist saint and possibly 
the greatest philosopher and theologian of the whole Middle Ages. 
Averroes was the last great Muslim peripateticist who possessed 
the title "Commentator". His influence spread in many directions, 
throughout the Middle Ages, and later during the Renaissance and 
up to the very threshold of modem times. He was regarded as one 
of the accredited expositors of the accepted philosophy of the 
church. Therefore, it is not surprising that his star has always 
shone more brightly in the western Christian world than in the 
Muslim world where it is dim.
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